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The Robinson R44 Four place Helicopter
(Followed by the
total accident history
of the R44)
When Frank Robinson and his Company created the R44 they
certainly created a winner. This helicopter is powered by a reliable Lycoming
540 CI reciprocating engine, and has an average empty weight of about 1625
pounds, with a Maximum Gross Weight limit of 2500 pounds. The early models have
a certificated max gross weight of 2400 pounds. The R44 carries a Maximum of 48
gallons of fuel and burns 14 gallons per hour (should be flight planned at 15).
With full fuel, the R44 can carry an additional 587 pounds (later models) of
passengers and/or cargo (average). This equates to four 146 pound people, three
195 pound people, or any other combination that does not exceed the maximum
rated gross weight. The earlier models, or Raven I or equivalent had an average
empty weight of 1,600 pounds, but a lower max gross which made the average
available weight capacity only 512 pounds. Now the R44 even comes with Air
Conditioning, and man does it work nice; just what we have come to expect from
Frank and Company.
Although
not an
equivalent to
the light turbine Bell 206 B and the MD 500, the Robinson R44 fills a 'market hole' that was left open by
the other US helicopter manufacturers when they went into the turbine market in
the early 1960's. From a business standpoint, it was negligent for other US
helicopter makers to ignore the need for a light piston engine helicopter. I am
sure however that other manufacturers such as Bell, and MD thought that their
new turbines would be all that was necessary. Back then, Frank Robinson worked
at Hughes, and tried to convince them of the need for a light helicopter such as the R22,
and R44 (or so the rumor goes). In the early 1970's, Frank Robinson boldly went
out on his own, and created the R22 (certificated in 1979), and the R44
(certificated in 1993), and he has never looked back. You can be certain
however, that the Robinson Helicopter Company has turned the heads of every
other helicopter manufacturer in the world. There is no disputing the fact that
the R22, and R44, in their class, have no competition.
Although the R44 is often billed as a direct
replacement to the
Bell Jet Ranger, and the MD 500 (which it is in come cases), it is not an equal.
Because I support Frank Robinson and his Company, I have been
disappointed to see some of the information which has
been supported by the Robinson Helicopter Company and which I see as somewhat
misleading. It is because of this that I post the
information here. Regardless, I do not dispute the fact that the R44 is an
excellent and safe helicopter.
The information that has lead me to this writing is an
article titled, "Turbine Reliability",
published in Rotor and Wing magazine March 2003, which was written by Robinson
Helicopter Company's Chief Flight Instructor, Tim Tucker.
Discrepancies in the Turbine
Reliability Article:
Note the figures on page two of the article: I find it
interesting that Tim Tucker used the total number of accidents, and
did not mention the fact that there are literally thousands more Bell 206
helicopters alone, not to mention the fact that there are also hundreds if not thousands more MD
500 helicopters flying, than there are Robinson R44 helicopters. Another very
important issue to note is that when using a model such as the Bell 206, this
takes in both the B and L models, which are as different as the R22 and the R44.
The Bell 206 L is the Long Ranger which is a much larger 7 place helicopter.
In the time frame depicted in Figure One, there were less than
500 Robinson R44 helicopters ever manufactured, yet the comparison is of the R44 to two different
manufacturers which have many times as many helicopters in the air which were
manufactured since the early 1960's. Due to the fact that the R44 had only been in production for 4 years, they had
not logged any appreciable number of flight hours to be compared to helicopters
that were literally logging more than a million flight hours every single year.
During the first 128 months (10 years and 8 months, 2/1993 -
9/2003) that the R44 was manufactured, 1,511 helicopters were made. This equates
to an average of 11.8 helicopters manufactured per month from day one (which is
not actual because there were less in the early years, and more in the later
years), but is close enough for this purpose. This
means that in the entire four year period depicted in Figure One, there were
only 566 helicopters made at best. During the four year period depicted in
Figure Two, there would have been only a total of 1,085 R44 helicopters ever
built.
Note also that in the two four year periods in these two
figures, the numbers are comparing all Robinson helicopters produced even if
they were just sold, and had no appreciable hours on them yet. The only fair
comparison then, would have been to compare an equivalent number of helicopters
manufactured in a similar time period by the manufacturers chosen to compare. This would have resulted in incredibly different numbers.
Note the four year period depicted in Figure Two: In this
figure, the insinuation is that the R44 is safer than the Bell Jet
Ranger and the MD 500. This comparison is of totally incomparable numbers; comparing helicopters which were flying literally millions
of hours, and had been for nearly 30 years (the Jet Ranger and MD 500), to
helicopters which were flying barely a few thousand hours (the R44), for only a
very few years.
The Factual History Reported by HAI
(Helicopter Association International):
Note on page one of the HAI report, the number of Single Engine
turbine hours flown annually to the number of reciprocating engine hours flown
annually. You may compare your choice of years, and you will get similar
results; here we will use the year 2003, the year of the article. The
single engine turbine flew 242 percent more hours annually, yet only incurred a
total of 17 more fatalities than reciprocating engine helicopters in the same
period.
Note that the accident rate per 100,000 hours flown (the only
accurate way to measure a comparison), was 21.8 for reciprocating engine
helicopters, while only 6.73 for single engine turbine helicopters.
Note the fatal accident rate, also per 100,000 hours flown:
Reciprocating engines - 3.0, and single engine turbine - 1.39. Isn't this
interesting? There are more interesting figures on the remaining two pages of
the HAI report. Things change when more realistic comparisons are made.
In the end, the R44 is still an excellent helicopter with an
impeccable safety record. If the helicopter job at hand requires a light load of, say
a pilot, two adult passengers, and a child, light duty executive transport,
personal transport, or light duty police and ENG work, then the R44 is an
exceptional choice.
If on the other hand, the duty at hand requires a larger load
than the 587 pounds permitted by the Robinson R44, then the Bell 206 Jet Ranger,
or the MD 500 is the appropriate choice.
The Costs of Operating the R44:
The actual cost of operating the R44 helicopter
may be a good bit more
than the
Operations
Cost Statement (hereafter referred to as the ROCS) published by Robinson
(Robinson makes an excellent effort to keep this up-to-date, and this is no different for any make helicopter since all manufacturers use
similar means of achieving the numbers),
especially if you will use the helicopter for commercial operations. We will
just go down the list from the top so it is easy to follow along. Also note that
most operators who use the R44 for personal transport do not fly more than 100
hours per year (the first year is always more as it is new to them), in fact they often fly less than 80 hours per year. It is
important to note that the most common use of the R44 is personal transport.
Insurance will cost from $21-25,000 per year. The
insurance which is used to figure the ROCS is figured using Pathfinder®,
which is an off-shore provider owned by Robinson. Why are they off-shore? You
figure it out. It is a good insurance company though, and makes insuring
affordable. You should be aware that when you insure
with Pathfinder®, the insured hull value depreciates with hours remaining on the
aircraft. This means that if you have an accident, or if you have storm damage
or anything else, you may not get paid a flat value of the aircraft as other
insurance companies do. This may be acceptable if you can take the hit
of a low insurance payment in the event of a loss. The insurance cost just more
than doubled if you cannot except the risk of using Pathfinder®.
Next we have the overhaul reserves.
The overhaul reserves are very important. There are many used aircraft sitting
on airport ramps and in hangers just because the owners scratched together
everything they had to purchase the aircraft, and then failed to set aside the
funds that would be necessary to rebuild the aircraft when the time came.
Overhaul reserves are expensive and must be set aside, and are a part of the
operating costs of any aircraft. The most significant difference in the ROCS is
the fact that in the parts kit supplied by the factory, there are no
miscellaneous items such as engine mounts etc. If the helicopter is returned to
the factory for overhaul (which I am told that for the R44 there is no choice),
the cost of overhaul will increase by many thousands of dollars. There are many
things that must be done at overhaul time which are not covered in the ROCS. If
the R44 is returned to the factory for overhaul, which is the only right way to
do it, the cost will be at least $60,000 more than shown in the ROCS. These
facts put the reserve at $91.86 per hour. Be very cautious of the
Overhaul Cost Spike.
Next comes the costs of fuel and
oil. It is far better to plan for more than less. An important issue here is the
fact that the burn rate is shown at 14 gph. Although it is likely that the
average burn will be 14 gph or less, I would plan 15 @ $4.50. For the cost of fuel, very
few airports are selling for less $4.00 anymore and
often it is much more. I even found one that is selling at $6.25. Oil also will
cost a good bit now selling for an average of $5 per quart for Aeroshell 100W
Plus. With an oil change every 25-hours (which you should be doing), and a
filter change every 50 hours @ $15 per filter, and considering that the
helicopter will use an average of 1 quart per 5 hours of operation; the oil
costs per hour including the filter changes equates to $3.40. Total fuel and oil
costs per hour (2007): $70.90
Maintenance. This is one where
there could be a lot of variation. Some owners like to participate in the maintenance,
and this will reduce the costs somewhat if you can find a mechanic that will
allow your participation. Another issue is whether or not you will even do the
100-hour inspections. I say that it is imperative to safety that the 100-hour
inspections are completed as recommended. If you fly more than 100 hours per
year, then one of these inspections will be an annual. Technically speaking, the
only difference between a 100-hour inspection and an annual is the fact that
100-hour inspections may be completed and signed off by an A&P rated technician,
while annual inspections must be completed and/or supervised and signed off by
an A&P with an IA (Inspector Authorization). The work which takes place is the
same on either inspection barring any abnormal discrepancies. I can assure you
that although you may get a 100-hour inspection for the ROCS, you will not get
an annual for that rate. I have found that in most cases, the annual costs are
often well in
excess of $1,600. The costs of these inspections will increase as time builds on
the aircraft. As a result I would add at least 50% to the ROCS for the periodic
inspections.
Airport costs - Hangering fees. No manufacturer
includes this as technically this is not an operating cost, but then on the
other hand you have to plan to keep that helicopter someplace. It is also very difficult to come up with a cost
standard since it can vary so drastically from one area to another. This will
vary, but will usually be from $250 per month ($3,000 annually) to $450 month
($5,400 annually) depending on the metropolis where you live and work, and
consequently will keep your aircraft.
Insurance - $46 per hour if you fly
500 hours per year. $23,000 / 500 hours annually
Airport costs - $6.00 per hour @ 500
hours per year & $250 month hanger fee.
Overhaul - $91.86 per hour - $202,098
/ 2200 hours
Fuel & oil - $70.90 per hour
Maintenance and Inspections - $19.20
per hour
Actual hourly cost of operation -
$230.96 per hour if you fly 500 hours per year, which will not be the
case if you are a personal use operator. You may fly 500 hours the first year,
however even that is very unlikely. Over all you will average far less than the
183 hours per year which are necessary for the costs of overhaul to be as
stated. If you average less than 183 hours per year, the
cost of overhaul spikes up tremendously. For
a personal use operator, who will average less than 100 hours per year the costs
will be as follows:
Insurance - $230 per hour if you fly
100 hours per year. $23,000 / 100 hours annually
Airport costs - $30.00 per hour @ 100
hours per year & $250 month hanger fee (they forgot this)
Overhaul - $91.86 per hour - $202,098
/ 2200 hours
Fuel & oil - $70.90 per hour
Maintenance and Inspections - $19.20
per hour
Actual hourly cost of operation -
$441.96 per hour if you fly 100 hours per year, and this does not
account for the spike in the overhaul costs.
What is this spike in the overhaul costs?
Overhaul Cost Spike. This cost spike is not completely unique to
the Robinson helicopters (other helicopter makes also have some components
which expire by calendar time), but is applicable to both the R44, and the R22. Both
the R44 and the R22 must be overhauled at 2200 hours or 12 years,
whichever occurs first. Did someone forget to tell you this? Don't worry,
you are not the only who didn't know. As a result of this stipulation, Robinson
helicopters must fly at least 183 hours per year to achieve the hourly costs
stated in the ROCS. If this does not happen, and this is the case all to often,
the overhaul costs per hour increase tremendously.
This is a complete list of every Robinson R44 Accident in the NTSB Database
to date (11/11/2004), in no particular order.
NTSB Identification: LAX93FA311 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, July 31, 1993 in EL MONTE, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/15/1994
Aircraft: ROBINSON R44, registration: N445RH
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
History of the Flight
Back to Top
On July 31, 1993, at 1349 hours Pacific daylight time, a Robinson R44
helicopter, N445RH, crashed during takeoff at El Monte airport, El Monte,
California. The helicopter was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR)
personal flight in the local area when the accident occurred. The helicopter,
registered to, and operated by Uni West Aviation Inc., Alhambra, California, was
destroyed by impact and post impact fire. The certificated private pilot, and
two passengers received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed.
The helicopter was cleared for takeoff by the El Monte Air Traffic Control Tower
(ATCT) and departed from a hover at the approach end of runway 19. Several
witness reported that the pilot maintained the runway heading over the
centerline. The takeoff and initial climb appeared normal. About 50 to 100 feet
above the ground (AGL), and at 50 knots of airspeed, the helicopter rapidly
descended to the runway in about a 35 degree nose down attitude with about a 30
degree right bank. The helicopter struck runway 19 about 1,900 feet from the
departure end. An intense post crash fire erupted and the fuselage came to rest
about 300 feet from the initial point of impact.
The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at latitude 34 degrees 05.16
minutes north and longitude 118 degrees 02.09 minutes west.
Crew Information
The pilot held a private pilot certificate, with a rotorcraft helicopter rating
that was issued on January 22, 1991. The most recent third class medical
certificate was issued to the pilot on January 13, 1992, and contained no
limitations. On the application for the medical certificate, the pilot listed
his total accumulated pilot time as 210 hours, with 50 hours accrued in the
previous 6 months.
Complete flight records for the pilot were not recovered and the aeronautical
experience listed in this report was obtained from a review of the airman FAA
records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center located in Oklahoma
City. In addition, partial pilot logbook pages from Robinson Helicopters files
and a portion of fire damaged logbook pages were reviewed.
According to the pilot/operator report submitted by the operator, the pilot's
total aeronautical experience consisted of 640 hours, of which 60 hours were
accrued in the accident aircraft make and model. In the preceding 90 and 30 days
prior to the accident, the report lists a total of 50 and 10 hours respectively
flown.
Safety Board investigators attempted to validate and reconstruct the pilot's
experience. On November 11, 1992, the pilot attended a three day Robinson R22
Safety Course, conducted by Robinson Helicopters. At that time, the pilot
indicated that he had accrued 425 hours of flight time. Robinson Helicopters
required 500 hours of total time to act as pilot-in-command of an R44. On May
28, 1993, the pilot attended a one day R44 Pilot Check-Out training course at
Robinson Helicopters. As verification that the pilot that accrued 500 hours of
flight time, the pilot sent a facsimile of two pages of a logbook to Robinson
Helicopters that reflected a total time of 525.2 hours. The logbook pages were
not dated.
At the conclusion of the R44 training, the instructor pilot from Robinson
Helicopters issued the pilot a certificate of training after finding that the
pilot's performance was satisfactory to fly the R44 as a 2-place helicopter for
at least 50 initial hours. To qualify to carry more than 1 passenger, the pilot
needed to return for another flight check after gaining the required R44 flight
time. On July 22, 1993, the pilot returned to Robinson Helicopters for his
second flight check in the R44. The instructor pilot did not require the pilot
to produce any verification that the pilot had accrued an additional 50 hours of
R44 flight time. The instructor pilot verbally acknowledged that the pilot was
authorized to carry more than one passenger; however, he did not issue a new
certificate of training at that time.
The operator produced a copy of a pilot logbook recovered from the helicopter
wreckage that was fire damaged. The logbook pages appeared to reflect flight
time accumulated by the pilot in the R44. The record did not reflect the dates
of various flights; however, the two pages totaled 35.0 hours.
Aircraft Information
The recording hour meter in the helicopter was destroyed. Examination of the
fire damaged aircraft maintenance logbook revealed that the helicopter was
manufactured on February 12, 1993. A 100-hour inspection was completed by
Robinson Helicopters on May 21, 1993, at an hour meter reading of 104.0, 70
hours before the accident. The helicopter was purchased by the operator on May
27, 1993. At that time the helicopter had accrued 106 hours. The operator and a
flight test mechanic for Robinson Helicopters reported that just prior to the
accident flight, the helicopter had accumulated a total time in service of about
174 flight hours.
The last entry in the maintenance logbook was July 14, 1993, at a hour meter
reading of 158.9. On that date the low rotor RPM warning horn unit was replaced
and the main rotor blades were re-tracked by a Robinson Helicopter mechanic. The
main rotor blade tracking was accomplished by adjustment of a trailing edge tab.
No portion of the flight controls, swash plate assembly, or pitch change links
were disturbed. The cyclic control assembly installed in the helicopter was
revision H.
The fuel system is gravity-fed (no fuel pumps) from the main fuel tank. An
auxiliary fuel tank (smaller and mounted higher than the main) drains into the
main tank through an inter-connecting line. The tanks are metal and are mounted
above a firewall separating the engine from the main transmission and fuel tank
area. The main rotor mast from the transmission is mounted vertically between
the two fuel tanks.
Fueling records at El Monte airport established that the helicopter was last
fueled just prior to departure with the addition of 15.4 gallons of 100LL octane
aviation fuel, which completely filled the main fuel tank. A mechanic for
Robinson Helicopters reported that the main fuel tank gage indicated full and
the auxiliary tank indicated less than 1/8 full.
Meteorological Information
The closest official weather observation station is El Monte, California, which
is located at the accident site. At 1349 hours, a surface observation was
reporting in part:
Sky condition and ceiling, scattered clouds at 18,000 feet; visibility, 7 miles;
wind, 180 degrees at 8 knots; altimeter, 30.00 inHg.
Communications
Review of the air-ground radio communications tapes maintained by the FAA at the
El Monte ATCT facility revealed that the aircraft communicated with the local
control position. No unusual communications were noted between the local
controller and the pilot during the review of the tapes.
Aerodrome and Ground Facilities
The El Monte airport is owned by The County of Los Angeles. The operation of the
airport is contracted to Comarco Airport Services Inc. The published elevation
of the airport is 296 feet mean sea level.
The airport is equipped a single hard surfaced runway on a 010 to 019 degree
magnetic orientation. The runway is 3,995 feet long by 75 feet wide, and is
equipped with medium intensity runway lights (MIRL), runway end identifier
lights (REIL), and a visual approach slope indicator (VASI) lights. An Automatic
Terminal Information Service (ATIS) weather broadcast is provided on a discrete
frequency of 118.75 mhz. No formal crash, fire fighting, or rescue services or
facilities are located on the airport, nor are any required. A small fire truck
is stationed on the airport.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Safety Board investigators examined the wreckage at the accident site on July
31, 1993. The examination of the impact site revealed paint marks and ground
scars in the runway surface, oriented parallel to the runway heading, about 9
feet west of the centerline, and about 2,000 feet from the approach end.
Examination of the forward ends of the landing gear skid tubes revealed that the
helicopter impacted in about a 35 degree nose down attitude and a 30 degree
right bank.
Portions of fragmented outboard ends of the main rotors were located scattered
along the left and right sides of the runway. The fragments displayed evidence
of chordwise scratching, primarily to the underside of the blade fragments. A
portion of a coiled electrical cord with an attached push-to-talk button was
located on the runway about 90 feet prior to the initial impact point.
Additionally, fragments of window plexiglass were also scattered along the sides
of the runway just prior to the impact site.
At the impact site, ground impact marks from the main rotor blades were located
progressively along the wreckage path at 23 feet, 14 feet, and 10 feet east of
the west edge of the runway. The impact marks averaged about 1 inch in depth.
The forward ends of the landing gear skid tubes were separated at the forward
cross tube attach points, which is about 3 and 1/2 feet aft of the tip. Both
forward ends exhibited longitudinal scratching about 7 to 8 inches long on the
underside of the tube, about 6 to 8 inches aft of their respective forward tip.
The right side skid tube was separated at the lower attach points of the forward
and aft cross tubes. The left side landing gear skid tube was separated at the
lower end of the forward cross tube. The aft cross tube was still attached at
the lower end of the left skid tube but was separated at the upper end of the
lateral cross tube attach point. The separation was in an outward direction and
displayed an aft twisting signature. The complete forward cross tube assembly
remained intact; however, was separated from the fuselage and from both skid
tubes. The lateral cross tubes did not exhibit any downward bending. All of the
landing skid segments were located between the impact point and the main rotor
mast assembly.
The main rotor mast assembly and main rotor blades, separated from the main
rotor transmission and fuselage as one unit and came to rest about 250 feet from
the impact point. The blades were attached to the rotor head and both exhibited
"S" bending. The blades displayed extensive chordwise scratching, leading edge
gouging, trailing edge compression, and tip destruction. The outboard portion of
each blade, including the leading edge and tip weights separated from the blade
structure. The blades tip weights were located about 800 feet east of the impact
site.
The main rotor static mast separated at the base were it attaches to the main
rotor transmission gear box. The static mast exhibited aft bending of about 8/32
inches, measured about mid-height between the top of the mast and the separated
base. The rotating mast also separated at the base of the transmission and
remained inside the static mast. It exhibited bending and torsional twisting
signatures. The vertical push-pull tubes remained attached to the swash plate
and were attached to the lower support jackshaft assembly. The jackshaft
assembly separated at its mounting points on the main rotor gear case.
Examination of the red blade pitch-change link revealed that it separated into
two pieces around the circumference of the upper end of the lower link. The
lower link was attached to the swashplate. The upper end was attached to the
separated portion of the red blade pitch horn.
The blue blade pitch-change link separated into three pieces. The upper link
threaded portion was attached to the blue blade pitch horn and exhibited about a
90 degree bend and fracture near its lower end. The remaining portion of the
threaded upper link and its corresponding lock nut that was normally threaded
into the upper end of the lower link was not initially located. The interior
threads of the lower link were undamaged.
The missing upper link threaded segment was located about 30 feet west of the
main rotor mast assembly. The lower threaded end of the recovered segment was
undamaged. The upper end exhibited bending and a fracture surface that matched
the separation of the upper link. The outer surface of the lock nut exhibited
gouging and grinding signatures. The lower link, along with the fork assembly,
separated from the swashplate attach point.
The swashplate, at the blue blade pitch-change attach point exhibited a fracture
at the outboard end bolt hole in an upward direction. The bolt hole was cracked
completely through the casting at the bottom (downward) portion of the bolt
hole. The teetering stops separated from the mast and were not located. The
blade droop stops remained intact.
Indentations produced by swashplate contact with the sliding uniball sleeve were
noted. One side exhibited an indentation about 2 inches above the bottom edge of
the sleeve. An indentation on the opposite side of the sleeve was found 1 and
3/4 inches above the bottom of the sleeve. According to the manufacturer, the
dents correspond to a collective up position of 90.8 percent and 67.9 percent
respectively. Disassembly of the rotor mast revealed bending of the rotor mast
adjacent to the mast data plate of about 0.300 of an inch in the direction of
the red blade attach point.
The vertical main rotor control push-pull tubes were attached to the jackshaft
assembly. They were separated at the lower mixing bell crank. The bell crank
assembly was separated from its fuselage mounting points and exhibited fire
damage. The torque tube from the mixing bell crank forward to the cyclic control
tube was attached at both ends; however, the center portion of the tube was
destroyed by fire. The push-pull tube from the mixing bell crank to the cyclic
control tube was attached by its rod-end bearings at both ends; however, the
tube was fractured at both ends of their respective rod ends. The center portion
of the push-pull tube was destroyed by fire.
The forward end of the collective control push-pull tube to the collective
support assembly was destroyed by fire. The aft end of the collective control
push-pull tube was fractured and burned. The engine governor switch located at
the forward end of the pilot's collective control was found in the "ON"
position. The tail rotor anti-torque push-pull tubes had numerous fractures and
fire damage. All of the observed fracture surfaces were oriented on numerous 45
degree angle planes consistent with overload signatures.
The cyclic control assembly was recovered from the burned cockpit area and
exhibited impact and fire damage. A fracture was noted below the attached
lateral control torque tube and above the forward attach point of the fractured
longitudinal control push-pull tube. The area of fracture occurred at the point
where the cyclic stick transitioned from a steel tube to a welded steel box
structure.
The longitudinal trim motor arm was measured at 15/16 of and inch in the
direction of maximum trim force applied on the longitudinal axis. The
manufacturer reported that this corresponds to 28 percent of the maximum forward
trim setting. The lateral trim motor arm was measured at 1 and 5/16 inches in
the direction of right lateral trim. This corresponds to 84 percent of its
maximum right trim setting. All of the elastic cord assemblies associated with
the trim system were destroyed by fire. The cyclic mounted lead shot pouch
utilized as a vibration dampening system was destroyed by fire.
The aft end of the tail boom, with the vertical and horizontal stabilizers
attached, was located laying on the main rotor mast assembly. The stabilizer
assembly had separated from the aft end of the tail boom and the fracture
surfaces were oriented on numerous 45 degree angle planes. The lower portion of
the vertical stabilizer exhibited a semi-circular indentation and black paint
smug on the leading edge, about 6 inches above the lower end.
The horizontal stabilizer exhibited a downward bend about mid-span of about 30
degrees and had paint removal and scraping on the upper surface of the outboard
end of the stabilizer. The upper end of the vertical stabilizer exhibited about
a 20 degree bend to the left and paint removal and scraping on the right side of
the stabilizer. The tail boom exhibited fire damage and melting to the forward
attach points, smoke damage along the right side, and scrape marks on the left
side at the aft end. The underside of the tail stinger did not exhibit any
scraping of the paint.
The tail rotor gear box separated from its mounting flange on the aft tailcone
bulkhead. The gearbox was located between the main rotor mast assembly and the
fuselage point of rest. The tail rotor blades remained attached to the gear box.
Both blades were destroyed and separated about 10 inches outboard of their
respective attach points. The tail rotor pitch control push-pull tube was
fractured at the forward and aft ends of the pitch control bell crank assembly.
The tail rotor drive shaft flex plate exhibited torsional fractures oriented in
the direction of rotation at the gear box input spline. The forward end of the
tail rotor drive shaft exhibited torsional twisting and fire damage at the tail
boom attach point.
The tail rotor drive shaft was intact from the upper sheave aft about 2 feet 4
inches, to about the tail boom attach point were it was damaged by fire. The
free wheeling unit located in the upper sheave assembly functioned properly.
Remnants of the engine drive belts remained between the upper and lower sheaves
and were fire damaged as was the alternator belt. The belt tensioning actuator
assembly was extended about one inch. The manufacturer reported that the
measurement corresponds to the belts being in the normal tightened range.
The drive shaft from the upper sheave to the main rotor transmission gear box
was intact. The forward side of the gear box contained a 1 inch by 2 inch hole
in the case. Small portions of metal were present in the beveled gear teeth,
preventing 360 degree rotation of the transmission. Disassembly of the gear box
revealed no other damage and proper rotation of the transmission was performed.
The engine remained attached to the fuselage frame at its respective attach
points. The exhaust tube was crushed in an upward direction at the aft end. The
cooling shroud around the lower mounted sheave and cooling fan were fire
damaged. Valve and gear train continuity and thumb compression was established
by hand rotation of the engine. The suction and pressure oil screens were free
of contaminants. Disassembly of the accessory gear case revealed proper
lubrication. The oil pump gears rotated normally and exhibited a bright, clean
appearance. The engine cylinders were removed and examined. No unusual
conditions were noted.
The magnetos were fire damaged. Hand rotation could not produce any spark at any
terminal. The wiring harness was destroyed by fire. The spark plugs did not
exhibit any unusual combustion signatures. The top and bottom plugs from the
numbers 2, 4, and 6 cylinders were oil coated.
The carburetor and air box remained attached to the engine. The fuel valve was
intact and found in the "ON" position. The metal floats of the carburetor and
the venturi were undamaged. The fuel screen was free of contaminants. The fuel
strainer was fire damaged. The throttle and mixture levers at the carburetor
were found in an intermediate position.
The post crash fire incinerated most of the cabin/cockpit area. Safety Board
investigators, however obtained some instrument readings (see Supplement B for
details).
Both fuel tanks sustained severe fire damage and both fuel caps were in place.
The upper, inboard longitudinal edge of the auxiliary fuel tank, exhibited a
semi-circular dent in an outboard direction that was consistent with the
diameter of the main rotor mast.
The Aviation Safety Engineering Branch of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board
produced a Light Bulb Filament Impact Dynamics Study in support of aircraft
accident investigation. The report is one of several studies of light bulb
filaments used as indicator and warning lights in aircraft. Research has
provided a basis for determining the condition of the light bulb at the moment
of impact. While illuminated, the tungsten filament is ductile from the heat
produced when the bulb is on. Impact forces can produce a stretched and uncoiled
filament, exhibiting a "snaking" appearance. If the bulb is off, the filament is
cold and impact forces produce brittle fractures of the filament, without
stretching.
The annunciator bulbs from the instrument panel were examined. The examination
revealed that the ENGINE LOW OIL PRESSURE bulb filament was stretched and
uncoiled. The "CLUTCH" bulb was damaged during removal and its filament
orientation could not be determined. The remaining annunciator bulb filaments
exhibited no evidence of stretched or uncoiled filaments.
Medical and Pathological Information
A post mortem examination of the pilot and passengers was conducted by the Los
Angeles County Coroner's Office on August 1, 1993. No pre-existing conditions
were noted during the autopsy which would have adversely affected the pilot's
abilities to pilot an aircraft.
Toxicological examinations of the pilot were conducted by the FAA's Civil
Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) on November 2, 1993 and was negative for all
screened drugs and alcohol.
Fire Aspects
Witnesses reported that flame and smoke was observed generally at the bottom of
the fuselage as the wreckage was still sliding to a stop from the point of
impact. An intense post crash fire immediately engulfed the wreckage at the
point of rest.
The County of Los Angeles provides El Monte airport with an Ansel 440, fire
fighting vehicle. The vehicle is equipped with 110 gallons of aqueous film
forming foam (AFFF), and 450 pounds of Purple K dry chemical extinguishing
agent. Both systems are independently charged by a nitrogen gas cylinder. A
single hose reel assembly is provided with independent internal hoses for each
system and separate nozzles for each fire suppression agent. The systems can be
charged by pushing a plunger, lifting a lever, or opening a valve on the
nitrogen bottle. A Comarco Inc. employee was on duty and responded to the
accident site with the fire truck.
Witnesses indicated that after the fire truck arrived at the scene, there
appeared to be some confusion about activation of the nitrogen system and a
delay in application of the fire suppression agents.
Tests and Research
Following the accident, fuel samples from the nozzle of Comarco Inc.'s fuel
truck were obtained and tested by the Exxon Company. They reported that the
sample was clear and bright and visually free of water, sediment and suspended
matter. The sample met the standards for aviation gasoline.
The main rotor swashplate assembly, including the red and blue pitch- change
links were submitted to the National Transportation Safety Board Materials
Laboratory for examination. All of the fracture surfaces exhibited evidence of
overstress separations. Hardness testing of the submitted components conformed
to design specified materials.
On January 26, 1994, the operator submitted the aircraft's cyclic control tube
assembly to the National Transportation Safety Board Materials Laboratory for
examination. The examination revealed fractures through two flat side plates of
the lower cyclic assembly without adjacent material deformation. After removal
of soot and oxidation, it was noted that several of the fracture planes were
flat and intersected the surface at a 90 degree angle consistent with a brittle
fracture mechanism such as fatigue cracking. Optical and scanning electron
microscope examinations revealed fracture surfaces that exhibited a river
pattern consistent with fatigue cracking.
Additional Information
In addition to the persons listed on page 5 of this report, the following
persons participated in this investigation:
Frank Robinson, Robinson Helicopters Inc., Torrance, CA. Ronald Hamilton,
Robinson Helicopters Inc., Torrance, CA. Kurt Robinson, Robinson Helicopters
Inc., Torrance, CA. Donald Skunberg, FAA-WP-LAX-FSDO, Los Angeles, CA. Lirio
Liu, FAA Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 E. Spring St., Long Beach, CA.,
90806.
Robinson Helicopters reported that following the accident, they were in
possession of 3 R44 aircraft and examined the cyclic control assemblies of the 3
helicopters. The results of a visual examination revealed:
Aircraft serial number 001; total time on aircraft, 120 hours; cyclic control
assembly C320-1 revision G, free of cracks; torque tube C319-1 revision F, free
of cracks. Aircraft serial number 002; total time, 258 hours; torque tube C319-1
revision F, free of cracks. Aircraft serial number 004; total time, 796 hours;
cyclic control assembly C320- 1 revision G, free of cracks.
Robinson Helicopters also reported that following the accident, more than a
dozen different parts in the cyclic control system were redesigned. The initial
effort to strengthen 5 accident damaged control system components resulted in
them individually being considerably stronger than the rest of the system.
Continued fatigue testing and redesign resulted in the entire cyclic system
being strengthened. The following parts were redesigned:
Collective fork; cyclic pivot assembly; 2 yokes; torque tube; cyclic stick
assembly; jackshaft assembly; cyclic control system; 4 jackshaft support points.
Wreckage Release
The Safety Board initially released the wreckage, located at Lynn's Aircraft, El
Monte, California, to the owner's representatives on September 21, 1993. The
swashplate assembly and pitch-change links were retained by the Safety Board for
examination until its release on November 10, 1993.
NTSB Identification: LAX00LA086 .
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14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 02, 2000 in PALO ALTO, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/9/2001
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N999EV
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
On February 2, 2000, at 1437 hours Pacific standard time, a Robinson R44,
helicopter, N999EV, was substantially damaged during a practice autorotation at
Palo Alto, California. Neither the commercial rated pilot nor the passenger was
injured. The personal flight was operated by the pilot under 14 CFR Part 91. No
flight plan was filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the
operation that originated at San Carlos, California, at 1427.
The pilot reported that during the autorotation the engine had been at idle for
an extended period. He said he did not think he was going to make the runway so
he added power. The engine failed to respond and the tail stinger contacted the
ground, resulting in the separation of the tail boom. The pilot pulled
collective pitch; the helicopter briefly became airborne and spun violently to
the right. The pilot maintained the helicopter in a level attitude and the
landed hard. After the main rotor stopped rotating, the pilot and passenger
exited the helicopter.
The pilot told the Federal Aviation Administration inspector on scene that he
did not use carburetor heat during the autorotation. According to the Palo Alto
METAR, the temperature was 64 degrees Fahrenheit and the dew point was 52
degrees Fahrenheit. Reference to a carburetor icing probability chart revealed
that this temperature and dew point were in an area of the graph annotated
"moderate icing-cruise power or serious icing-glide power."
NTSB Identification: CHI02FA049.
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14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, December 12, 2001 in Waukesha, WI
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/13/2003
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N7007F
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 1 Minor.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On December 12, 2001, about 1822 central standard time, a Robinson R44
helicopter, N7007F, was destroyed when it impacted power lines and impacted
Interstate Highway 43 near Waukesha, Wisconsin. Four motor vehicles were
damaged. The helicopter impacted one of the motor vehicles and the remaining
three motor vehicles sustained minor damage. The helicopter was piloted by an
airline transport pilot. The flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 91. Night
visual to instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time
of the accident. No flight plan was on file. The pilot was fatally injured, one
motor vehicle occupant sustained serious injury, and one motor vehicle occupant
sustained minor injury. The positioning flight originated about 1810 from the
Lawrence J. Timmerman Airport (MWC), near Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and was destined
for East Troy Municipal Airport, near East Troy, Wisconsin.
A witness, who had been a passenger on the flight immediately prior to the
accident flight, stated:
At approx. 4:40 pm we launched from MWC after taking on fuel. We flew to
a tannery fire at 3rd [and] Oregon approx 5 mi. north of MKE [General
Mitchell International Airport]. We orbited the fire taking pictures
until approx 6 pm. We then returned to MWC. I exited the aircraft at
approx. 6:10 pm and the pilot told me he was going back to the East Troy
airport to hangar the aircraft. At the time it was dark [and] cloudy with
drizzle.
The pilot requested to transition through the Waukesha County Airport (UES),
near Waukesha, Wisconsin, airspace. The air traffic controller on duty at UES
stated the following.
Chopper 12 called Waukesha tower and requested to transition from
the northeast to the southwest. I instructed him Chopper 12 to
remain outside of the airspace and that he would have to circumnavigate
due to the fact that Waukesha was in IMC [instrument
meteorological condition] conditions. Chopper 12 acknowledged
and stated that he would remain approximately 5 - 5 1/2 miles
east southeast. This was the last contact with Chopper 12 by
Waukesha tower. UES weather - 130000Z 12005kt 1 1/2 SM DZ
OVC004 07/07 A2989.
A witness who had been driving in a motor vehicle stated the following:
We were the third vehicle directly in the path of the helicopter, approx
1/4 mi. in front of our vehicle. I, ..., was driving and saw a red light
over what seemed like the median a few 100 ft. in the air. The light rose
almost straight upward maybe another 200 ft and then began corkscrewing
downward. It was very foggy and difficult to see anything. We stopped,
turned on our yellow strobe and hazard flashers, and went up to check the
pilot. My wife telephoned 911 for help.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane
multiengine land rating and DC-9 type rating. He held commercial privileges for
airplane single-engine land, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument helicopter.
He held a flight instructor certificate for airplane single and multiengine,
rotorcraft-helicopter, instrument flight instructor airplane and helicopter
ratings. He held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical
certificate issued on July 24, 2001, with no restrictions. At the time of that
medical, he reported 12,000 hours total flight time. He held a statement of
demonstrated ability for defective color vision dated March 13, 1985. The
operator reported the pilot had 14,351.4 hours total time, 2,291.2 hours in
rotorcraft, and 250.7 hours in this make and model aircraft.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident helicopter, N7007F, serial number 0508, was a Robinson R44,
four-place, single main rotor, single-engine helicopter, with a spring and yield
skid type landing gear. The primary structure of its fuselage was welded steel
tubing and riveted aluminum sheet. The tailcone was a monocoque structure
consisting of an aluminum skin. Fiberglass and thermoplastics were used in the
secondary structure of the cabin, engine-cooling system, and in other ducts and
fairings. The doors were constructed of fiberglass and thermoplastics. A 260
horsepower Lycoming O-540-F1B5 engine, serial number L-25207-40A, powered the
helicopter. The helicopter contained a standard airworthiness certificate dated
September 11, 1998 and a registration certificate dated September 19, 2000. The
pilot's operating handbook stated that "THIS ROTOCRAFT APPROVED FOR DAY AND
NIGHT VFR [visual flight rules] OPERATIONS" and is to be placarded as such in
"clear view of pilot." A review of the helicopter's maintenance logbooks
revealed that an annual inspection was completed on October 7, 2001 and that a
100-hour inspection was completed on December 5, 2001. The 100-hour inspection
entry noted the Hobbs meter read 2837.1 hours.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1745, the MWC weather, about 15 miles northwest of the accident site, was
recorded as: Wind 150 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 4 statute miles; present
weather mist; sky condition overcast 1,400 feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew
point missing; altimeter 29.94 inches of mercury.
At 1845, the MWC weather was recorded as: Wind 150 degrees at 5 knots;
visibility 3 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast 800
feet; temperature 6 degrees C; dew point missing; altimeter 29.90 inches of
mercury.
At 1745, the Waukesha County Airport (UES), near Waukesha, Wisconsin, weather,
about 10 miles north of the accident site, was recorded as: Wind calm;
visibility 2 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast 600
feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew point 7 degrees C; altimeter 29.91 inches of
mercury.
At 1845, the UES weather was recorded as: Wind 120 degrees at 5 knots;
visibility 1 statute miles; present weather drizzle; sky condition overcast 400
feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew point 7 degrees C; altimeter 29.87 inches of
mercury.
At 1815, the Burlington Municipal Airport (BUU), near Burlington, Wisconsin,
weather, about 15 miles south of the accident site, was recorded as: Wind calm;
visibility 1 1/4 statute mile; sky condition overcast 300 feet; temperature 7
degrees C; dew point 7 degrees C; altimeter 29.89 inches of mercury.
At 1835, the BUU weather was recorded as: Wind 110 degrees at 3 knots;
visibility 1 statute mile; sky condition overcast 300 feet; temperature 7
degrees C; dew point 7 degrees C; altimeter 29.88 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The helicopter came to rest on the northbound lanes of Interstate Highway 43
about 200 feet southwest of power lines that cross the highway near its
intersection with State Highway 164. The area was photographed and the
helicopter wreckage was relocated to a hangar.
An on-scene investigation was conducted. Waukesha County Sheriff's photographs
revealed the tailcone's skin was separated at a riveted splice joint. The
photographs show the skid's struts were hinged upward and outward. A forward
section of the right skid was torn from the right skid at the point where it is
attached to its strut. The right side landing gear strut and strut fairings
exhibited serrated cutting and scoring on their outboard surfaces. The ground
handling wheel support brackets on the right landing gear skid were deformed in
an outboard direction. A center section of a main rotor blade was separated from
its leading edge and was retained to the blade's trailing edge. The engine's
cowling was detached from the right side of the helicopter and was retained to
the fuselage on the left side. The engine cooling fan exhibited scoring and
folding in a direction parallel to its rotational direction. The upper drive
belt sheave exhibited circumferential scoring on its forward and aft surfaces.
The upper sheave exhibited a semicircular gouge on the belt pulley surface
adjacent starter's ring gear. The carburetor was found detached from the engine.
Throttle, mixture, and carburetor heat control continuity was traced from the
cockpit to the engine. Control continuity was traced to all flight control
surfaces. The engine rotated and produced a thumb compression at all cylinders.
A magneto produced spark at five of its six leads. The remaining lead was found
torn and a spark was observed at the torn section. Removed spark plugs exhibited
a gray color. The Hobbs meter read 2864.4 hours on-scene. The fiberglass chin
portion of the front right side of the cabin exhibited a linear tear. The right
side forward and aft cabin doors exhibited a linear scratch across them. The
right navigation light assembly was found with a semicircular deformation. The
tailskid exhibited a semicircular deformation on its surface. The red navigation
light filament was found stretched. The helicopter's color scheme contained
blue, white, and red colors. The helicopter main rotor's had yellow as one of
the colors in its scheme. No pre-impact anomalies were found.
A power line maintenance helicopter examined the power lines that crossed the
highway. A maintenance crewmember reported the following:
I inspected the helicopter crash site at I-43, on December 14,
2001. I inspected the static wire span, hands on, and found some
plastic and fiberglass shavings. I also found three different color
paints, mainly blue, very little yellow and a tiny bit of red.
The static wire did not have any broken strands at all. The static
shoes were pulled toward the contact paint. I also found one
broken damper and two knotted-up armor rods.
The locations of apparent contact points on the shield wire was an
area 35 - 40 feet just North of mid-span.
A power line employee reviewed sag, tension, and clearance data. He calculated
that the wire was about "146' over the roadway."
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Waukesha County Coroner's Office.
The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute prepared a Final Forensic Toxicology
Accident Report. The report was negative for all tests performed.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The parties to the investigation included the FAA, Robinson Helicopter Company,
and Textron Lycoming.
The aircraft wreckage was released to a representative of the operator.
Robinson issued Safety Notice SN-26 January 1987 and revised it June 1994. That
notice stated:
NIGHT FLIGHT PLUS BAD WEATHER CAN BE DEADLY
Many fatal accidents have occurred at night when the pilot
attempted to fly in marginal weather after dark. The fatal accident
rate during night flight is many times higher than during daylight
hours.
When it is dark, the pilot cannot see wires or the bottom of clouds, nor
low hanging scud or fog. Even when he does see it, he is unable to
judge its altitude because there is no horizon for reference. He
doesn't realize it is there until he has actually flown into it and
suddenly loses the outside visual references and his ability to
control the attitude of the helicopter. As helicopters are not
inherently stable and have high roll rates, the aircraft will
quickly go out of control, resulting in a high velocity crash
which is usually fatal.
A Flight For Life Pilot stated, "On December 12th, 2001[,] at 1832 CST[,] a
request was received for Aeromedical transport from an accident on [Highway] 164
and [Interstate] -43 by the Waukesha Co. Sheriff's Dept. I determined weather
conditions were not acceptable so the flight request was denied."
NTSB Identification: FTW02WA210
14 CFR Non-U.S., Non-Commercial
Accident occurred Saturday, July 13, 2002 in Bavaro, Dominican Republic
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: HI-757CA
Injuries: 2 Minor.
On July 13, 2002, at 1340 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R44 helicopter,
Dominican Republic registration HI-757CA, was substantially damaged during a
hard landing while landing at a heliport near Bavaro, Higuey, in the Dominican
Republic. The commercial pilot and his passenger sustained minor injuries. The
helicopter, serial number 0451, was owned and operated by Helicopteros del
Caribe, S.A., of Santo Domingo. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed
throughout the area for the business flight for which a flight plan was filed.
The flight originated from the Punta Cana Airport at 1310.
The accident investigation is under the control and jurisdiction of the
Government of the Dominican Republic. Any further information may be obtained
from:
Presidencia de la Republica Dominicana
Secretaria Administrativa de la Presidencia
Direccion General de Aeronautica Civil (DGAC)
Edificio de Oficinas Gubernamentales
Avenida Mexico Esq. Dr. Delgado
Bloque "A", Segundo Piso
Apartado Postal 1180
Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana
This report is for informational purposes only and contains only information
released by, or obtained from the DGAC of the Dominican Republic.
NTSB Identification: ATL98IA039 .
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14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Thursday, January 22, 1998 in MIAMI, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/16/2001
Aircraft: Robinson R-44, registration: N972SA
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
On January 22, 1998, about 2230 eastern standard time, a Robinson R-44
Helicopter, N972SA, experienced a partial cyclic control stick failure while
hovering to land at the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport, Miami, Florida. The
helicopter was operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part
91, and visual flight rules. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no
flight plan was filed for the local, personal flight. The private pilot was not
injured, and the helicopter sustained no damage. The flight departed Fort
Lauderdale, Florida at 2200.
According to the pilot, as he was attempting to land, the helicopter began to
drift right. He applied left cyclic control, but "just past the center of cyclic
movement, the cyclic felt as if it hit a stop". The pilot rotated the cyclic 360
degrees to ensure the cyclic was not set at full right trim. There was no
effect. The pilot made a run-on landing, using right turns, without further
incident.
Further examination of the cyclic revealed that the lateral trim actuator shaft
was not properly aligned. The shaft exhibited wear concurrent with its position
in a guide bearing. After sufficient quantity of the shaft was worn, the shaft
became lodged in the guide bearing. Once lodged, the lower end of the shaft and
a guide spring became loose and interfered with the surrounding structure,
resulting in the partial loss of lateral control.
After this incident, the inspection criteria for the lateral cyclic trim system
was reviewed. The criteria did not include a measurement of the shaft wear.
There was a service bulletin, SB-19, that dealt with excessive shaft wear on
Robinson R-44 helicopters which directed mechanics to replace the lateral cyclic
trim assembly shaft, Part Number (P/N) C585-1, if the diameter was decreased
0.001 inch per 100 hours or a diameter of less than 0.238 inch. This Service
Bulletin, however, was for R-44 helicopters Serial Numbers (S/N) 0002 through
0321, and it did not apply to the incident helicopter. Subsequent to this
incident, a new Service Bulletin, SB-26, was released for R-44 helicopters, S/N
0002 through 0420 and 0425, 0426, and 0427. SB-26 stated that the lateral cyclic
trim assembly shaft, P/N C585-1, should be measured in several places. If the
shaft diameter varies more than 0.004 inches in any 0.50 inch of length, the
assembly should be replaced before further flight. After the release of SB-26, a
priority Airworthiness Directive (AD), AD 98-04-12, was issued to require
compliance with the terms of SB-26.
NTSB Identification: IAD99WA033
14 CFR Non-U.S., Non-Commercial
Accident occurred Tuesday, March 02, 1999 in SINES, Portugal
Aircraft: Robinson R-44, registration:
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may
contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.
On March 2, 1999, approximately 1825 local (Portugal) time, a Robinson R-44,
registration CS-HEI, serial no. 0448, owned and operated by Heliportugal, and
contracted for electronic news gathering by a national television news station,
sustained substantial damage following a loss of engine power and autorotation.
Daylight and visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the
accident. The commercially certificated pilot and the passenger were not
injured. The flight was conducted under Portuguese CAA rules.
The pilot was flying the helicopter en route to the Heliportugal operations base
at Casias Municipal Airport, following work in television news-gathering. At
1,300 feet mean sea level, in the vicinity of Sines, Portugal, the helicopter
passed within 1,000 meters of the main lobe of a high frequency (HF), high
energy broadcasting transmission antenna. The pilot reported that he suddenly
noted strong interference in the intercommunications system and on the
communication and navigation radios, followed by illumination of the low rotor
RPM and clutch lights. He further noted that the engine noise dropped to idle
level, and the engine and rotor RPM indications dropped. He lowered the
collective immediately to maintain rotor RPM and entered into an autorotation.
During the descent he adjusted the collective to keep the rotor RPM indication
in the green arc. At approximately 200 feet, the engine responded to throttle
input, and the engine accelerated rapidly, resulting in the engine and rotor RPM
exceeding the upper limitations. The pilot landed successfully and there were no
injuries. After landing, he noted that the lower rotor RPM and clutch lights
were extinguished, and cockpit indications were normal. He then lifted off and
flew the helicopter to base.
Visual examination found severe damage to the main rotor blades, which were
removed and replaced. Examination found no electronic systems damage or other
damage to the helicopter. The engine governor was removed and sent for
laboratory examination relative to suspected severe electromagnetic and radio
interference impinging upon engine and related systems.
The helicopter had 89:40 total flight hours at the time of the accident. Records
showed that the next, 100 hour inspection, was due at 105:15 total hours.
The pilot had a total of 2,098 helicopter flight hours, including 30 hours in
the R-44.
For further information, contact: Investigator-in-Charge, Frederico J. F. Serras,
tel. 351-1-8423500, fax. -581, Lisbon. NTSB: U.S. Accredited Representative,
Thomas R. Conroy, (202) 314-6314, Washington, D.C.; Engineering Investigator,
Scott Warren
NTSB Identification: NYC01FA053 .
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14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, December 04, 2000 in SANDGAP, KY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/2/2001
Aircraft: Robinson R-44A, registration: N744FC
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On December 4, 2000, about 1910 Eastern Standard Time, a Robinson R-44A, N744FC,
operated by Christian Cardiology, Manchester, Kentucky, was destroyed when it
impacted rising terrain near Sandgap, Kentucky. The non-instrument rated,
certificated private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Night
instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site. No flight
plan had been filed for the business flight that was conducted under 14 CFR Part
91.
The pilot, along with two company employees were en route to Lexington,
Kentucky, to acquire additional equipment for a planned expansion of the pilot's
medical practice. According to witnesses, the flight had been planned to depart
from his office in Manchester, with an intermediate stop at Jackson, Kentucky,
and then proceed to Lexington.
The pilot was estimated to have departed about 1850. Several witnesses along the
route of flight reported either seeing or hearing a helicopter fly by. However,
a check of the times the helicopter was observed or heard, revealed most were
earlier than the departure time of the accident flight.
Two witnesses in a vehicle, were headed toward McKee, Kentucky, about 1910. They
observed a bright glow on the opposite side of a ridgeline through clouds. One
of the witness reported the glow lasted for about 5 seconds and described it as
similar to a sunrise. The other witness reported a low cloud covered the top of
the ridge. Neither witness saw or heard the helicopter prior to the glow, nor
was any smoke observed after the glow. Based upon the witnesses' observations,
the wreckage was found on December 5, 2000.
The accident occurred during the hours of darkness at 37 degrees, 31.272 north
latitude, and 84 degrees, 04.911 minutes west longitude.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a private pilot certificate for rotorcraft - helicopter, issued
on May 21, 2000. According to the pilot's airman application, his flight
experience was 176 hours with 22.6 hours of solo/pilot-in-command (PIC), all in
Robinson R22s. Additional flight experience was reconstructed through incomplete
pilot logbooks, and maintenance records of helicopters flown. At the time of the
accident, the pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be 386 hours,
with 232 hours as PIC. He was estimated to have accumulated 326 hours in the
Robinson R-22, and 60 hours in the Robinson R-44A.
On September 9, 1999, the pilot was issued a Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), third class airman medical certificate, with a limitation to wear
corrective lenses for distant vision, and possess glasses for near vision.
Interviews with the two flight instructors, who flew with the pilot, revealed
that both thought he was an above average student. However, one flight
instructor expressed concern about the pilot's awareness of his own limitations
as a low time pilot.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The helicopter was not approved for flight in instrument meteorological
conditions. It was equipped with dual VHF communications radios, an encoding
altimeter, and a GPS with a moving map display. Other than the GPS, no
navigation equipment was installed. The helicopter was estimated to have
accumulated about 60 hours since new at the time of the accident.
The last documented refueling occurred at the airport in London, Kentucky, on
December 1, 2000. At that time, the helicopter was serviced with 38.8 gallons of
100 LL aviation grade gasoline.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
All telephone contacts with FAA Flight Service Station weather briefers are
recorded, and available for review. A check of FAA facilities found no record of
a pre-departure weather briefing.
The pilot's wife reported they had a security monitoring system in the office.
She had reviewed the tape after the accident, and observed her husband making at
least two phone calls to check the weather prior to departure.
Alternate means of obtaining weather were available to the pilot through the use
of pre-recorded weather from a variety of different sources. However, when a
person calls the various pre-recorded weather sources, no record is made of the
telephone call.
The three closest weather-reporting stations to the accident site were London,
Jackson, and Lexington, Kentucky.
London had a field elevation of 1,212 feet. The distance and bearing to
Manchester and the accident site were 079 deg at 16 NM, and 003 deg at 26 NM
respectively. Between 1800 and 2000, the visibility varied between 8 and 9
statute miles, and the lowest ceiling was between 1,500 and 2,000 feet AGL.
Jackson had a field elevation of 1,381 feet. The distance and bearing to
Manchester and the accident site were 223 deg at 34 NM, and 267 deg at 37 NM
respectively. Between 1800 and 2000, the visibility was 10 statute miles, and
the ceiling varied between 1,400 and 1,600 feet AGL.
Lexington had a field elevation of 979 feet. The distance and bearing to
Manchester and the accident site were 145 deg at 66 NM, and 147 deg / 40 NM
respectively. Between 1800 and 2000, the visibility varied between 6 and 7
statute miles. The lowest ceiling varied between 900 and 1,100 feet AGL.
The most recent area forecast (FA) prior to departure of the accident flight was
issued at 1445 on December 4, 2000. The outlook for eastern Kentucky was broken
clouds at 2,000 feet msl, with tops at 4,000 feet msl. In the extreme portions
of eastern Kentucky, the sky would be clear until 1700. The outlook was for
marginal VFR ceilings.
According to the Accident Prevention Program Publication, FAA-P-8740-30B, HOW TO
OBTAIN A GOOD WEATHER BRIEFING, marginal VFR conditions are when the ceiling is
between 3,000 feet and 5,000 feet AGL, and/or visibility is between 3 and 5
statute miles inclusive.
Two AIRMETS (Airmen's Meteorological Information), with three geographic areas
for specific types of weather were contained within the area forecast. The
geographic areas covered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) - referred
to in the AIRMET as IFR, mountain obscurement, and icing conditions.
The geographic area for IMC conditions (IFR), and icing conditions covered the
planned route of flight for the helicopter. The geographic area for mountain
obscurement covered the departure point. However, the accident site was outside
of the geographic area.
Following are the AIRMET comments for IMC conditions, mountain obscurement, and
icing conditions.
IMC Conditions - Indiana and Kentucky - Occasional ceilings below 1,000
feet/visibility below 3 statute miles, with mist and/or fog. Conditions ending
by 1700 to 1900. Conditions developing extreme eastern Kentucky by 1700 to 1800.
Conditions continuing beyond 2200 through 0400 December 5, 2000.
Mountain Obscurement - Kentucky and Tennessee - Mountains occasionally obscured
with cloud, mist, and fog. Conditions continuing beyond 2200 through 0400
December 5, 2000.
Icing Conditions - Indiana and Kentucky - Occasional moderate rime and mixed
icing in precipitation below 4,000 feet AGL. Conditions ending by 1700 to 1900.
Conditions continuing beyond 2200 through 0400, December 5, 2000, in Kentucky.
Witnesses along the route of flight reported variable weather, with fog or
overcast conditions, while the person who saw the glow from the impact reported
he could see the moon through breaks in the clouds, and there was no fog in the
area. Further, he reported the visibility was about 1 mile.
A pilot who had several years experience operating in Kentucky reported that the
hills in eastern Kentucky can generate weather when none is forecast. He further
reported that you could not always count on the forecast weather to remain as
indicated, and that it could be significantly better or worse than forecast.
RADAR AND OTHER REMOTELY RECORDED DATA
Radar data was received from the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center (ARTCC).
A check of both code 1200, and non-beacon targets failed to identify the
helicopter on its route of flight.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The helicopter was examined at the accident site on December 6 and 7, 2000. The
terrain was rolling hills covered by trees. There was no ground lighting in the
area of the accident site.
The flight path of the helicopter crossed a north/south ridgeline with an
elevation of 1,400 feet, and with higher terrain to the north. The first
observed ground contact was with a tree on the east side of the north/south
ridgeline, about 30 feet above the top of the ridge. The upper 10 feet of the
trunk and upper branches were freshly scraped and the bark was missing. In
addition, several branches on the top had been broken off at the same height,
and the ends of the limbs were puffed out. Higher trees beyond the initial tree
strike in the direction of flight were not damaged.
All major components were accounted for at the accident site. The debris trail
started beyond the tree and continued for 670 feet on a heading of 305 degrees
where the main wreckage was found. Lighter items were found on the right side of
the debris trail and heavier items were found on the left side of the debris
trail.
The first item on the ground, identified as from the helicopter, was located on
the top of the ridgeline, about 182 feet from first known tree strike, on a
heading of 004 degrees magnetic. It consisted of a partial decal from the
battery box located in the nose of the helicopter. This was followed by pieces
of plexiglas, numerous small pieces of unidentified metal, doorframes, and
doors, a large piece of the trailing edge of one main rotor blade, a tail rotor
blade, pieces of the rear case of various cockpit instruments, the instrument
panel frame, the rear fuselage cowling, and finally the main wreckage. Most
items were on the ground; however, several items remained in the upper branches
of the trees.
The main accident site contained the fuselage, two partial main rotor blades,
the tail boom, the 90-degree gearbox, and the landing skids.
The main rotor turned freely in the direction of rotation. It would not rotate
when force was applied opposite to the direction of rotation. The drive belts to
the clutch were burned and not identified. The belt tension actuator was found
in position, identified by a representative from Robinson Helicopters, as within
the normal range.
The main rotor drive shaft was bent about 20 degrees, about 6 inches below the
teetering head. The elastomeric stops on both sides of the teetering head were
present and split. The main rotor drive shaft under the elastomeric stops was
dented on both sides.
The blue main rotor blade was bent upward 90 degrees, about 37 inches outboard
of the main rotor shaft. About 99 inches outboard from the main rotor shaft, the
main rotor blade was bent down, and the aft honeycomb section of the blade had
separated. The honeycomb section of blade was recovered several hundred feet
away. At 61 to 69 inches inboard from the tip, the underside of the aft
honeycomb section exhibited scratches in multiple directions.
The outboard portion of the red main rotor blade was separated about 27 inches
from the main rotor shaft. The outboard portion of the red main rotor blade was
found in the main wreckage area, and was attached to the inboard portion by the
trailing edge doubler.
The paint on the leading edge of both main rotor blades had numerous nicks,
chips, and chord wise scratches from inboard to tip.
One tail rotor blade found in the debris trail, was bent away from the tail boom
and the plane of rotation for the tail rotor blades. This blade had separated
from the tail rotor hub. The other tail rotor blade remained attached to the
rotor hub, and was bent in toward the tail boom. The 90-degree gearbox casing
remained in the tail boom, and the drive shaft and gear, which fit into the
casing had separated from the case. One vertical cut on the left side of the
tail boom was at the same location as the arc of the tail rotor blades.
The leading edges of the right side horizontal stabilizer, and vertical fin had
been penetrated, consistent with tree branch impact. The penetrations were
outside of the arc of the main rotor blades. No evidence of a main rotor blade
strike to the tail boom was found.
The aluminum flight controls in the cockpit/cabin were not identified.
Individual components were identified; however, their pre-impact positions could
not be determined.
A small piece of cabin structure, from the intersection of the vertical and
lateral bows for the front windshield was recovered along the debris trail. This
part also contained the vent line for the battery. The forward or front side was
deformed, with a cylindrical impression, about 3 inches in diameter, orientated
vertically.
The engine crankshaft was rotated and valve train continuity was confirmed. The
upper spark plugs were gray in appearance with no evidence of impact damage. The
magnetos were attached and had been burned. When the engine was rotated, the
internal gear that drove the magnetos rotated. However, no rotation was observed
on either magneto.
The carburetor had separated from the engine and was recovered along the debris
path at the main impact. The carburetor had not been exposed to fire and the
venturi was in place.
FIRE
A fire consumed the fuselage and cabin. No evidence of soot patterns was found
on the rear fuselage cowling or tail boom.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The toxicological testing report from the FAA Toxicology and Accident Research
Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was negative for drugs and alcohol for the
pilot.
On December 6, 2000, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for Kentucky,
Frankfort, Kentucky, conducted autopsies on the pilot and passengers.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The accident site was located on a direct line between Manchester, and
Lexington. A witness who was en route to Lexington to meet the pilot reported
that it was not unusual for the pilot to change his destination en route, if
there was a need.
He further reported that he had received a page from one of the passengers on
the helicopter at 1908. He returned the call, and received static the first
time. He tried the number a second time, and the number was answered by voice
mail. He then tried the cell phones of the other two occupants in the
helicopter, including the pilot, and was unable to reach anyone.
Wreckage Release
The aircraft wreckage was released to a representative of the owner's insurance
company on December 8, 2000.
NTSB Identification: MIA00LA011 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 19, 1999 in FT. LAUDERDALE, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/30/2000
Aircraft: Robinson R-44, registration: N8364Z
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
On October 19, 1999, about 1705 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R-44,
N8364Z, registered to Heliflight Leasing, Inc., operating as a Title 14 CFR Part
91 sales demonstration flight, sustained a main rotor strike and separation of
the tail boom upon landing at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight
plan was filed. The helicopter received substantial damage and the CFI-rated
pilot, a private pilot-rated student, and a passenger were not injured. The
flight departed the same airport about 1 hour before the accident.
According to the pilot-in-command, as he set the helicopter down for final
landing, the craft bounced 1 to 2 inches and at the top of the bounce, he
mistakenly applied right cyclic. Despite his applying corrective controls, the
main rotor collided with the ground and the tail boom. In rapid succession, the
nose pivoted 180 degrees, the tail boom was severed, and the landing skids
sustained ground collision damage. In subsequent telephone conversations with
the NTSB, the pilot stated that there were no contributing factors such as
surface winds, propeller or rotor wash, or helicopter control problems, and he
would characterize the event as, "..just bad technique".
NTSB Identification: NYC00WA123
14 CFR Non-U.S., Non-Commercial
Accident occurred Wednesday, April 26, 2000 in CESIS, Latvia
Aircraft: Robinson R-44, registration: LYHBH
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may
contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.
On April 26, 2000, about 1600 Greenwich Mean Time, a Robinson R-44, a
helicopter, registration LY-HBH, was destroyed when it impacted the ground about
6 miles northwest of Cesis, Latvia. The pilot and three passengers were not
injured.
This investigation is under the jurisdiction of the Government of Latvia. Any
further information pertaining to this accident may be obtained from:
Civil Aviation Administration Airport "Riga" LV-1053, Riga Latvia
This report is for informational purposes only, and contains only information
released by the Government of Latvia.
NTSB Identification: FTW03LA163
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Thursday, May 29, 2003 in Brazos Blk 532, GM
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N7188K
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On May 29, 2003, approximately 0400 central daylight time, a Robinson R44
single-engine helicopter, N7188K, was destroyed when it impacted the water near
Brazos Block 532, in the Gulf of Mexico. The airline transport rated pilot, who
was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter was registered
to and operated by Tarlton Helicopters, Inc., Houston, Texas. Dark night visual
meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan was filed for the
14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 non-scheduled, on-demand air cargo
flight. The flight departed the William P. Hobby Airport (HOU), near Houston, at
0320, and was destined for an offshore platform located at the Mustang Island
Area East Addition, Block A-133, in the Gulf of Mexico.
According to the operator, the 73-year-old pilot departed HOU with a load of
parts needed at an offshore platform. The pilot estimated an en-route time of 1
hour and 30 minutes to complete the 70 nautical mile flight, and estimated a
total fuel on board of 2 hours and 30 minutes. After the pilot was reported
missing, a search was initiated.
On May 29, 2003, approximately 1100, the body of the pilot and debris from the
helicopter were located by the U.S. Coast Guard, at 28 degrees 19.15 minutes
north latitude, and 95 degrees 56.2 minutes west longitude. The ocean depth in
the vicinity of the debris field was estimated to average from 100 to 120 feet.
According to a Federal Aviation Administrator (FAA) inspector, the debris that
was located included two skid float assemblies, cushions, and miscellaneous
items. The helicopter was not recovered and is presumed destroyed.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
A review of the FAA records revealed the pilot held an airline transport pilot
certificate with rotorcraft-helicopter and airplane single-engine land ratings,
and he also held a commercial certificate with airplane single-engine sea and
airplane multi-engine land ratings. The pilot was issued a second class medical
certificate on October 8, 2002, with a limitation for wearing corrective lenses.
The certificate was not valid for any class after October 30, 2003.
The operator reported the pilot had accumulated a total of approximately 15,000
hours in all aircraft, 7,500 hours in rotorcraft, and 107 hours in the make and
model of the accident helicopter. The pilot had flown approximately 2 hours in
the previous 90 days.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The 2001 model Robinson R44 Clipper, serial number 1073, was powered by a
six-cylinder Lycoming O-540-F1B5 (serial number L-25926-40A) engine, normally
rated at 260 horsepower. The helicopter was equipped with a global positioning
system (GPS) receiver.
The operator reported the airframe and engine had accumulated approximately 730
total hours. The helicopter flight manual and helicopter maintenance records
were aboard the helicopter and not recovered. The date and type of the most
recent continuous airworthiness inspection was not determined.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 0253, the HOU Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), located on-shore
approximately 40 nautical miles northeast of the debris field, reported the wind
from 240 degrees at 3 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, sky clear, temperature
66 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 61 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting
of 30.03 inches of mercury.
At 0353, the Palacios (PSX) ASOS, Palacios, Texas, located on-shore
approximately 15 nautical miles northwest of the debris field, reported the wind
from 280 degrees at 3 knots, 8 statute miles visibility, sky clear, temperature
70 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 66 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting
of 30.03 inches of mercury.
The U.S. Naval Observatory reported the moonrise was at 0528.
PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the deputy medical examiner, Office of
the Medical Examiner of Travis County Forensic Center, Austin, Texas, on May 30,
2003, and specimens were retained for toxicological analysis by the FAA's Civil
Aeromedical Institute's (CAMI) Forensic and Accident Research Center. According
to the autopsy report, "[the pilot] died as a result of multiple traumatic
injuries sustained in a helicopter accident."
The results of the toxicological test were negative for alcohol and all screened
drug substances.
NTSB Identification: CHI03FA181.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, June 25, 2003 in Coleta, IL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/30/2004
Aircraft: Robinson R44 II, registration: N7512P
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On June 25, 2003, about 0830 central daylight time, a Robinson R44 II
helicopter, N7512P, operated by Berg Aviation Inc., was destroyed when it
impacted terrain near Coleta, Illinois. The business flight was operating under
14 CFR Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the
accident. No flight plan was on file. The pilot and two passengers were fatally
injured. The flight originated from a private airfield near Mukwonago,
Wisconsin, about 0730, and was en route to Kansas City, Missouri, when it
impacted terrain.
A witness saw a helicopter heading in a southwestly direction. She stated:
As I watched the copter lost [altitude]. I thought perhaps it was
getting below our light cloud cover. The copter continued to loose
altitude. I heard no surge of power. The copter didn't seem to
have maneuvering difficulty. It still continued to lose altitude. I
noticed the propeller losing speed. The copter appeared to lose
half of its [altitude] very quickly. Before the copter actually went
down, the blades appeared to stop rotation and then I counted 2
blades. I didn't hear any noise on impact. Nor did I see smoke or
flames.
Another witness stated:
... At about 8:30 AM I was standing outside of home heard a plane
having trouble coming from [the northeast] heading [southwest]
motor seemed to be having trouble. Motor never stopped but took a
nose dive in to field. Return to house [and] had [my] wife call 911.
The Whiteside County Sheriff's Department report showed that a 911 call was
received at 0832. The helicopter was found in a cornfield at 41 degrees
54.501minutes North latitude and 89 degrees 48.207 minutes West longitude.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a student pilot certificate. The back of that certificate showed
a flight instructor's endorsement, dated March 15, 2003, to solo a Robinson R44.
The certificate stated in bold lettering, "Passenger-Carrying Prohibited." He
held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate
issued on March 13, 2003, with no limitations. At the time of that medical, he
reported 60 hours total flight time to date and 60 hours in the six months prior
to that examination. The medical application asked, "Do you currently use any
medication (Prescription or Nonprescription)?" The pilot indicated "No."
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident helicopter, N7512P, serial number 10046, was a Robinson R44 II,
Raven, four-place, two-bladed, single main rotor, single-engine helicopter, with
a spring and yield skid type landing gear. The primary structure of its fuselage
was welded steel tubing and riveted aluminum sheet. The tailcone was a monocoque
structure consisting of an aluminum skin. A Lycoming IO-540-AE1A5, serial number
L-28594-48A, engine rated at 205 horsepower, powered the helicopter. The
helicopter had a five-minute takeoff rating of 245 horsepower. The helicopter
contained a standard airworthiness certificate dated February 4, 2003, and a
temporary registration certificate dated March 7, 2003.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 0835, the Whiteside County Airport-Joseph H. Bittorf Field, located 13.2
nautical miles and 151 true degrees from the accident site, recorded weather
was: Wind 200 degrees at 6 knots; visibility 8 statute miles; sky condition
clear; temperature 27 degrees C; dew point 18 degrees C; altimeter 29.98 inches
of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
An on-scene investigation was conducted. The helicopter was found resting on its
left side. The helicopter's heading was about 78 degrees magnetic. The left side
of the helicopter cabin was crushed inward. The rotor blades remained attached
to the rotor head. The rear landing skid crosstube was detached from fuselage
and was found about 21 feet south of the fuselage. The muffler was detached from
the engine and was found about 26 feet south of the fuselage. The tail cone was
separated aft of the squirrel cage blower. The detached tail cone was found
about 23 feet southwest of the fuselage. The left hand side's fuel cap was found
lying on the ground about three feet from its filler neck. A semicircular area
of vegetation between 15 and 40 feet southwest of the fuselage exhibited blight.
The Hobbs meter read 95.8 hours.
The engine was rotated by hand and it produced a thumb compression at five of
its six cylinders. The cylinder that did not produce a thumb compression
sustained impact damage. The magnetos were removed. One magneto was able to
produce spark at all leads when it was rotated by hand. The other magneto
sustained impact damage and was retained for further examination. The mechanical
fuel pump ejected a blue liquid when manipulated by hand. The electric fuel pump
pumped a liquid when an electric current was applied. The fuel distribution
valve contained a liquid consistent with avgas. The fuel servo contained a blue
liquid and a sample of it was retained for testing. Both fuel tanks were
ruptured. Engine control continuity was established from the cockpit to the
engine. Flight control continuity was traced from the cockpit to the main and
tail rotor blades. The main and tail rotor gearboxes fully rotated when turned
by hand. No pre-impact anomalies were detected with the helicopter or its
engine.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Whiteside County Coroner's Office.
The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) prepared a Final Forensic Toxicology
Accident Report. The report stated:
0.377 (ug/ml, ug/g) AMPHETAMINE detected in Blood
10.479 (ug/ml, ug/g) AMPHETAMINE detected in Urine
0.626 (ug/mL, ug/g) FLUOXETINE detected in Blood
FLUOXETINE present in Urine
NORFLUOXETINE present in Blood
NORFLUOXETINE present in URINE
TESTS AND RESEARCH
The magnetos, fuel distribution valve, distribution lines, fuel injectors, and
fuel servo were taken to RLB Accessories, Addison, Illinois, for testing on July
2, 2003. The left magneto rotated at various speeds and produced spark at all
leads. The magneto retard operated as designed. The p-lead operated as designed.
The right magneto had a bent shaft. The right magneto rotated at various speeds
and produced spark at all leads. The p-lead operated as designed. The tachometer
points operated as designed.
The fuel servo had a bent mixture control shaft. The shaft was stiff and moved
fully from idle cut off to wide-open throttle position. The idle cut off was
able to stop the fuel flow when the mixture control shaft was manually pushed
into its normal position. No other anomalies were detected on the servo. The
servo met service limits during the flowmeter testing. The test specification
sheet and data collected during testing are appended to the docket material
associated with this investigation.
The fuel distribution valve operated correctly. Fuel injectors delivered an
equal flow of test liquid as observed and collected in containers.
The hydraulic system was sent to its manufacturer for testing and a NTSB air
safety investigator oversaw the testing. The examination and testing revealed
that the servos sustained impact damage and that they did not meet production
specifications. The testing showed that the servos' cylinders did move in both
directions with hydraulic pressure applied and that the cylinders could be moved
without hydraulic pressure. The hydraulic pump was test run and it met
production specifications. The manufacturer's accident report is appended to the
docket material associated with this investigation.
The engine was sent to its manufacturer for disassembly, examination, and
documentation. The examination, to include Service Bulletin 388B valve checks,
revealed no pre-impact anomalies. The manufacturer's report on the disassembly
is appended to the docket material associated with this investigation.
The retained blue liquid sample was sent to the DuPage County Crime Laboratory,
Wheaton, Illinois, for analysis. The analysis revealed "the presence of aviation
gasoline." That analysis is appended to the docket material associated with this
investigation.
A FAA inspector collected a fuel sample from the pilot's refueling storage tank.
The United States Air Force Reserve unit at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, forwarded the
fuel sample to the Aerospace Fuels Laboratory at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. The
laboratory tested the fuel and their report stated that the sample met the
specifications of 100LL. The laboratory's report on the fuel is appended to the
docket material associated with this investigation.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FAA regulations stated:
61.53 Prohibition on operations during medical deficiency.
(a) Operations that require a medical certificate. Except as
provided for in paragraph (b) of this section, a person who
holds a current medical certificate issued under part 67 of
this chapter shall not act as pilot in command, or in any
other capacity as a required pilot flight crewmember, while
that person:
(1) Knows or has reason to know of any medical condition
that would make the person unable to meet the requirements
for the medical certificate necessary for the pilot operation; or (2) Is taking medication or receiving other treatment for a
medical condition that results in the person being unable to
meet the requirements for the medical certificate necessary for
the pilot operation.
91.17 Alcohol or drugs.
(a) No person may act or attempt to act as a crewmember of a civil
aircraft -
...
(3) While using any drug that affects the person's faculties in any
way contrary to safety; or
Fluoxetine is a prescription antidepressant also indicated for the use of
obsessive-compulsive disorder and bulimia nervosa (an eating disorder) and often
known by the trade name Prozac. Norfluoxetine is a metabolite of fluoxetine.
Amphetamine is a stimulant, often known informally as"speed." It may be
prescribed for conditions including narcolepsy, obesity, and attention deficit
and hyperactivity disorder, but it is often a drug of abuse and has a high
incidence of addiction.
The parties to the investigation included Robinson Helicopter Company, Textron
Lycoming, and the FAA.
The aircraft wreckage was released to a representative of the helicopter's
owner.
NTSB Identification: NYC04CA199.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, August 27, 2004 in Wildwood, NJ
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N315SG
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
On August 27, 2004, at 2150 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R44, N315SG,
was substantially damaged landing at the Cape May County Airport (WWD),
Wildwood, New Jersey. The certificated commercial pilot was not injured. Night
visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the
local flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
According to the pilot, as he was setting the helicopter down onto a dolly, it
felt unstable, and he elected to abort the landing. As the pilot raised the
collective, the helicopter lurched forward and began to spin to the left. The
pilot lowered the collective, reduced the throttle, and the helicopter touched
down hard onto the ground, spreading the landing skids.
Inspection of the dolly, and the landing skids on the helicopter, revealed that
the rear portion of the left skid became stuck under metal framework, which was
exposed in an open area near the center section of the dolly.
Inspection of the helicopter revealed that the main rotor blade severed the tail
cone and damaged the tail rotor system.
NTSB Identification: SEA04WA184
14 CFR Non-U.S., Non-Commercial
Accident occurred Wednesday, September 08, 2004 in Roma, Australia
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: VH-JWX
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
On September 8, 2004, about 1845 Eastern Standard Time, a Robinson R44
helicopter, VH-JWX, was substantially damaged after impacting terrain while
approaching a homestead near Eurella Station, located approximately 29 nautical
miles west-southwest of Roma, Queensland, Australia. The helicopter was
operating under the provisions of the Australian civil aviation regulations. The
pilot and sole passenger sustained fatal injuries. The accident occurred at 26
degrees 06 minutes south latitude and 148 degrees 02 minutes east longitude.
It was reported that the helicopter was seen approaching the homestead but the
pilot and passenger did not subsequently arrive at the house. A search found
that the helicopter had impacted the ground.
The accident is under the jurisdiction of and is being investigated by the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Further information can be obtained from:
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
15 Mort Street, Braddon ACT 2612, Australia
P.O. Box 967, Civic Square ACT 2608, Australia
Phone +61 2 6274 6464
Fax +61 2 6274 6434
Web site www.atsb.gov.au
NTSB Identification: LAX04FA037B
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, November 06, 2003 in Torrance, CA
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N442RH
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may
contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.
On November 6, 2003, at 1528 Pacific standard time, a Robinson R22 Beta II,
N206TV, and a Robinson R44, N442RH, collided in midair while in the traffic
pattern at Zamperini Field, Torrance, California. Pacific Coast Helicopters was
operating the R22 under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. Robinson Helicopter
Company was operating the R44 under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The solo
student pilot in the R22 sustained serious injuries. The certified flight
instructor (CFI) and the private pilot undergoing instruction (PUI) in the R44
sustained fatal injuries. Both helicopters were destroyed; the R44 was partially
consumed by a post crash fire. The R22 departed on a local instructional flight
about 1430. The R44 departed on a local instructional flight about 1435. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plans had been filed. The R22
came to rest between runways 29R and 29L; the R44 came to rest on the departure
end of runway 29L.
The R44 had departed to a practice area for air work. It returned to the airport
and was on a touch-and-go landing for runway 29L. The R44 had been using right
traffic for runway 29R for practice touch-and-go landings, and then used runway
29L for several landings prior to the accident.
The instructor for the solo student had been watching the student during his
flight. The student flew the R22 from its parking area between taxiways D and E
to a helipad north of runway 29R. The student practiced on the helipad and then
completed several touch-and-go landings to the helipad. He requested a return to
his parking area. Upon hearing this request, the instructor turned the volume of
his radio down and turned to talk to a bystander.
Witnesses familiar with the airport reported that there were several procedures
for helicopters to return from the helipad to the parking ramp. One method was
to hover taxi across the runways to the ramp. In another procedure, the pilot
would do a right 270-degree turn and cross midfield at 500 feet. The controller
in the air traffic control tower would tell the pilot when to cross the runways.
A preliminary review of recorded radio transmissions indicated that the R22 had
been cleared to the right downwind. The controller told the pilot of the R22
that he would cross the R22 at midfield as soon as he had a chance. About 20
seconds later, the controller instructed the R22 pilot to turn right. About 30
seconds later, the controller told the R22 pilot that he was cleared to land
runway 29R, and the pilot replied, "Roger." A few seconds later, the controller
repeated the clearance to land runway 29R, but received no acknowledgement.
Witnesses reported that the two helicopters collided about 50 feet in the air
over runway 29L. The R22 was transiting across the left runway on an estimated
260-degree course.
NTSB Identification: ATL04FA141
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, June 27, 2004 in Barnesville, GA
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N441MG
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may
contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final
report has been completed.
On June 27, 2004 at 0530 eastern daylight time a Robinson Helicopter R44,
N441MG, registered to and operated by MG Aviation, collided with trees during a
cross-country flight in a residential area in Barnesville, Georgia. The personal
flight was operated under provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91. Instrument
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and no flight
plan was filed. The helicopter sustained substantial damage. The certified
flight instructor, and two passengers were fatally injured. The flight
originated from Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport, Greer, South
Carolina, on June 27, 2004 approximately 0300.
According to a witness, at 0530 a helicopter was heard over the residential area
in Barnesville, Georgia. Shortly afterward, an explosion was heard. When
witnesses searched the area, a helicopter was found engulfed in flames. Efforts
by the witnesses extinguish the flames were unsuccessful. No radio communication
was received from the pilot prior to the accident.
Examination of the wreckage site revealed the helicopter came to rest
approximately 25 yards behind a residential home. The wreckage path was
approximately 35 feet in length on a northerly heading. Freshly cut trees were
along the wreckage path. The helicopter came to rest at the base of a tree and
the main fuselage was fire damaged. The tail boom section was broken, and
buckled. The main rotor blades were buckled and separated from the main rotor
mass. The tail rotor shaft was separated from the tail boom and lodge in a tree.
The tail rotor gearbox was separated and the tail rotor blades were broken. The
landing skids were broken and separated from the fuselage. Additional helicopter
wreckage debris was found forward of the main wreckage.
NTSB Identification: ANC04LA024.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 18, 2004 in Daytona Beach, FL
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N323TC
Injuries: 3 Minor.
On February 18, 2004, about 1300 Eastern standard time, a skid-equipped
Robinson R-44 helicopter, N323TC, sustained substantial damage when it collided
with terrain during aerial taxi for takeoff from the Spruce Creek Airport,
Daytona Beach, Florida. The helicopter was being operated as a visual flight
rules (VFR) business flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident
occurred. The helicopter was operated by Timberline Aviation Services LLC, a
real estate development company, of Knoxville, Tennessee. The airline transport
certificated pilot and the two passengers received minor injuries. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed for the local area flight, and no flight
plan was filed.
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
investigator-in-charge (IIC), on February 19, the pilot, who is an employee of
the real estate development company, reported that the purpose of the flight was
to look over an area for a prospective airpark renovation. The pilot added that
gusty wind conditions prevailed during the accident takeoff. He said that just
after takeoff, as he hover taxied the helicopter towards runway 05, a strong
gust of wind from the right pushed the helicopter to the left, and over an area
of grass-covered terrain. He said that the helicopter subsequently descended,
the left skid contacted an area of grass-covered terrain, and the helicopter
began to roll to the left. As the roll continued, the main rotor blades
contacted the grass-covered terrain, and the helicopter rolled onto its left
side. The helicopter sustained structural damage to the tail boom, fuselage, and
to the main rotor and tail rotor drive systems.
The pilot noted that there were no preaccident mechanical anomalies with the
helicopter.
NTSB Identification: MIA04LA061.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, March 17, 2004 in Ocala, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/30/2004
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N7194S
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
On March 17, 2004, about 0030 eastern standard time, a Robinson R44, N7194S,
registered to a private individual, rolled over while descending following
liftoff from a dolly at the Ocala International-Jim Taylor Airport, Ocala,
Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight
plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The helicopter was
substantially damaged and the private-rated pilot and one passenger were not
injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.
The pilot stated that after lifting off a platform to a 3-5 foot hover with all
engine indications in the green and the governor on, the engine experienced a
loss of power and the helicopter began descending. The helicopter had drifted to
the left a bit off the dolly and one of the skids contacted the dolly and the
helicopter rolled onto its left side but came to rest on its right side. The
pilot had the helicopter recovered and placed back in his hangar before NTSB or
FAA notification. Numerous attempts were made by the NTSB investigator-in-charge
to contact the owner to gain access to the hangar for the purpose of removing
the engine from the helicopter for an attempted engine run; the pilot/owner did
not respond to these attempts. Review of the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft
Accident Report form submitted by the pilot revealed that the yes and no blocks
were marked in the area titled, "Mechanical Malfunction Failure."
According to a preliminary police report, after being notified by an anonymous
phone call, they arrived at the airport, opened the hangar, and noted the odor
of an alcoholic beverage coming from inside the helicopter.
Examination of the helicopter while it was in the hangar was performed by an FAA
airworthiness inspector. The inspector reported that the helicopter sustained
substantial damage.
NTSB Identification: MIA00FA060 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, January 03, 2000 in CAYEY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/17/2001
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N233MP
Injuries: 4 Uninjured
On January 3, 2000, at about 1430 Atlantic standard time, a Robinson R44,
N233MP, registered to Heli-Secure Corporation, operated by Avietch, as a 14 CFR
Part 91 demonstration flight crashed during a forced landing in the vicinity of
Cayey, Puerto Rico. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight
plan was filed. The helicopter sustained substantial damage. The commercial
pilot and three passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from San
Juan, Puerto Rico, about 1 hour before the accident.
The commercial pilot stated he was in cruise flight over a residential area
between 500 to 700 feet and about 70 to 80 knots, when the helicopter
experienced a loss in rotor and engine rpm. He lowered the collective pitch and
increased throttle with negative results. The helicopter was descending; he
observed power lines to his front and an open field to his right. He started a
right turn towards the field, but realized he could not make it. He saw a steel
carport adjacent to a house, and made a forced landing to the carport. The
helicopter touched down on the car port, the aircraft set level for about two
seconds when the right skid slipped through the tin roof causing the helicopter
to roll over on its right side, and the main rotor blades collided with the
roof. (For additional information see NTSB pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident
Report and Statement FAA Aviation Safety Inspector Statement an attachment to
this report.)
The wreckage of N233MP was transported to Robinson Helicopter Company for
further examination. The wreckage arrived in a sealed container on February
15,2000, and was examined by the NTSB and parties to the NTSB investigation on
March 27, 2000. Examination of the airframe and flight control assembly revealed
no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. The engine assembly
was mounted in a dynamometer test cell on March 28, 2000. The engine produced
corrected power of 252 horsepower at 2,800 rpm which exceeds the R44 derated
requirements of 225 horsepower 5-minute takeoff rating and maximum continuous
rating of 205 horsepower at 2,692 rpm.
After the test run, the engine was examined for leaks, cracks, or other
anomalies. None were found. The engine did not exhibit any excessive heat
discoloration or evidence of excessive oil consumption.
The Robinson Helicopter Pilot's Operating Handbook contains policies regarding
the use of carburetor heat. The handbook states: "If an unexplained drop in
manifold pressure or rpm occurs, apply full carb heat for about one minute and
check for an increase in manifold pressure or rpm. Regardless of CAT gauge
temperature, apply full carb heat prior to reducing power for descent or
autorotation." The carb heat control was found in the cold (off) position and
the pilot stated in his pilot report that he did not use carb heat and suspected
that might be the cause for the engine power loss. (For additional information
see NTSB Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report and Textron Lycoming Air
Safety Investigation Aircraft Mishap Report Field Notes an attachment to this
report.)
The wreckage of N233MP was released to Mr. Sherwood Bresler, Robison Helicopter
Company on May 29, 2001.
NTSB Identification: SEA01FA089.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, May 11, 2001 in Gorst, WA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/3/2002
Aircraft: Robinson R44, registration: N111PH
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On May 11, 2001, approximately 0922 Pacific daylight time, a Robinson R44,
N111PH, registered to a private individual and operated by Classic Helicopter
Corp., as a 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight, experienced an in-flight
breakup while maneuvering about three miles south of Gorst, Washington. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed.
The helicopter was destroyed by impact damage and post-crash fire. Both the
flight instructor and private pilot were fatally injured. The flight originated
from Boeing Field, Seattle, Washington, about 15 minutes prior to the accident.
Most witnesses were at various locations on the Trophy Lake Golf Course located
about one-quarter to one-half mile away. One witness reported that he heard a
sound and glanced up to see the helicopter initially traveling toward the golf
course, then looked as if forward flight stopped before it made "some radical
flight maneuvers." The witness described a sound difference with the main rotors
before it lost 75 to 100 feet in altitude. The helicopter then made a "radical
snap roll" maneuver before beginning a "cork-screw" dive. Prior to impact, the
witness noticed that at about 200 to 250 feet above ground level, the tail
rotors separated followed by the tail section separation at about 100 to 150
feet AGL. The witness then lost sight of the helicopter in the trees. Shortly
thereafter, the witness heard an explosion and observed smoke. One other witness
reported similar circumstances.
Several other witnesses reported hearing a "loud bang," "popping," "coughing,"
or "rough running" engine noise which brought their attention to the helicopter.
Each of the witnesses reported observing the helicopter in a "nose down" or
"wobbling" attitude while it spun, nose left, to ground impact. Prior to ground
impact, the witnesses observed an object or objects separating from the
helicopter.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
Personnel at Classic Helicopter reported that the flight instructor was also the
Director of Operations for Classic Helicopter. The instructor held flight
certificates for commercial and flight instructor instrument operations, and
rated in rotorcraft. The flight instructors total flight time in all helicopters
was estimated as 11,200 hours, with 252 hours in the make and model helicopter
involved in the accident. The instructor held a Class II medical certificate
dated 1/31/01, with a limitation to wear corrective lenses. The week prior to
the accident, the instructor flew 1.6 hours in a Bell 206, 1.3 hours in a
Robinson R22, and 6 hours in another Robinson R44 operated by Classic
Helicopter.
The second pilot, seated in the right seat, was receiving instruction and
building flight time in preparation for the purchase of his own Robinson R44. At
the time of the accident, the second pilot held a private pilot certificate for
single-engine land aircraft and helicopter operations. The pilot's total flight
time was estimated as 451 hours, with 386 hours in rotorcraft and 65 hours in
fixed wing aircraft. The pilot had accumulated 6.5 hours of the company required
10 hours of dual flight time in the R44. The pilot held a Class III medical
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