Helicopter Flight Information

On Tuesday October 12, 2010, the FAA published its proposed fix.... 

for the apparent high accident rate in the HEMS industry as well as some other proposed fixes for the commercial helicopter aviation accident rates. Contained on this page is a break down of the major changes they have proposed.

The FAA proposal as published in the federal register can be viewed here. There is much preamble and accident reference to support their decisions followed by a section with their intended changes to the FAR's. The FAR's are a legal document therefore they can be confusing and difficult to understand at times; this is why FAA inspectors themselves will not put anything in writing with regard to FAR's.

No one is more critical of the FAA than I am because all to often rather than do what is right, they do whatever it takes to justify their existence. If it were not for those facts, the FAA was created with good intent. It is the employees of the agency which have become the poison within. Some of the proposed changes are greatly needed, and are the result of the aviating public NOT policing themselves which has resulted in the need for the FAA to do something, anything to save face.

The FAA has used the fact that there has been an increase in the number of HEMS accidents as a driving force for the changes. This is really due to the mounting pressure from the NTSB, and the public. The FAA knows that accidents are going to occur, and they also know that the proposed changes will have limited if not minimal effect on the accidents which are occurring. BUT, it will show that they (the FAA) have done something. Ultimately the FAA does not have any idea of how many hours are actually flown, as they have no method in place to gain that knowledge; consequently, they have no real idea of the actual accident rate (number of accidents per 100,000 hours flown). Their methods of guessing hours, as has been testified by numerous professionals in the industry including the NTSB and HAI, are greatly flawed to say the least.

It is important to note that a lot of the mounting pressure to do something is due to the fact that HEMS accidents, just like those of major airlines are centers of attention by the media. Everyone knows when one occurs no matter how far removed they are from the locality. The difference between HEMS (as well as most helicopter aviation) and part 121 (airlines) is that helicopter operations, especially HEMS, occur in close proximity to the ground involving landings in remote locations, and general flight occurs at very low altitudes. The inherent dangers involving helicopter operations have been known since the day they were invented, but nothing else can even come close to doing the job. Part 121 aircraft on the other hand fly at very high altitudes while landing and taking off from well lighted airports with protected approach and departure paths. There is no way that helicopter aviation can ever be compared to part 121 flight operations, but the FAA cannot just come out and say that.

With the above stated, and with the lack of responsibility and discretion exhibited from commercial pilots flying helicopters, and with the mounting pressure from management to maximize profits, something needs to be done. This is also the time to make it known that the often touted status of 'for profit vs non-profit', means absolutely nothing since profit vs non-profit is simply a tax status and nothing more. ALL companies must make be profitable to exist, regardless of the tax status. The most significant changes in this latest FAA proposal are noted below with comment (change = change to, or addition of):

Change to 91 - Revision of helicopter visibility minimums while operating in class G airspace.

This change adds a 1/2 statute mile day, and 1 statute mile night minimum visibility for helicopters which did not previously exit; helicopters could simply operate 'clear of clouds'.

This is the result of what happens when pilots and operators do not adequately police themselves. One more freedom lost to the government. If you don't protect yourself, they will protect you from yourself especially if it is THEIR best interest. Freedoms lost are never regained. Unfortunately, this minimum probably does not go far enough, and will likely not represent a significant increase in safety. Face it, if you are operating with 1/2 mile visibility and you either don't have an instrument rating, or you have the rating but minimal experience, you are on a suicide mission if you don't land right now. Also, any experienced pilot knows how quick 1/2 mile can go to zero.

The FAA missed the boat here with regard to HEMS altogether, but they don't really care. The bottom line is that visibility minimums are simply to low for HEMS operations. Therefore this change will do absolutely nothing except show that the FAA is doing something. The FAA could have added safer visibility and altitude minimums for HEMS in their new part 135.6xx, but they didn't. This demonstrates an effort of the FAA to save face rather than do something about the real issue involving HEMS accidents, but indicative of the way the FAA does things.  

Change to Part 120 - Drug and alcohol testing.

FAR part 120 was again a result of people failing to police themselves; although not helicopter related, remember the drunk pilots in Miami? This change is the requirement for operators with more than ten bases of operation to utilize an operations control center, and requires those specialists to be alcohol and drug tested.

Change to 135.63 - Requirement for a Load Manifest with a duplicate copy not carried on the aircraft.

This basically ascertains that the NTSB, the FAA, and company investigators will have access to the weight and balance data for an accident flight where nothing related to weight and balance could be recovered at the scene of the accident.

There are to many variables for this to be effective. For example, when a HEMS helicopter departs on a flight to pick up a patient, they know what the maximum patient weight they can carry is however they likely don't yet know the actual patient weight. If the patient is to large in the current configuration, then changes are made at the scene or hospital. Although it will give certain data, it will not be accurate, and ultimately will do absolutely nothing for the prevention of accidents.

Change to 135.160 - This change adds a requirement for a radio altimeter. Accident Reference 1    Accident Reference 2

The FAA used the above referenced accidents to substantiate these changes, the reports can be viewed via the links. The NTSB noted the lack of radio altimeters as a contributing factor in these accidents.

Radio altimeters are an excellent tool, and a great addition to any cockpit. But to think that they will prevent accidents in these cases is ludicrous. A radio altimeter shows the altitude above terrain where you are currently located; they shoot downward in a conical pattern which in low flying helicopters is essentially straight down. Most, if not all, radio altimeters have a warning bug which can be set at a minimum altitude which is sometimes required by operators per their policies and/or operations manuals. This bug may or may not sound a tone through the aircraft intercom system each time the aircraft descends through the minimum altitude setting which can become annoying. This is a tone of about 1 second or so in length, and will not resound unless the aircraft climbs above the minimum setting and descends through it again. In other words, if the aircraft descends through the bug, the tone extinguishes after about 1 second with no further tones unless the aircraft again climbs above the bug setting.

Many pilots set this bug to zero despite the requirement to set it at a predetermined minimum thereby defeating the purpose entirely. Setting the bug to zero does not render the altimeter useless, quite the contrary; the altimeter can be viewed and used as needed just without the warning bug; but the pilot must pay attention to it.

Accident reference 1 above: Since the altimeter shoots downward, the altimeter would provide no useful function with regard to that which a pilot would be about to encounter as he approached the wall of a volcano while in minimal visibility. This could also be the wall of a canyon, or a mountain rising rapidly from a valley. Even with the proposed visibility minimums, and a radar altimeter, the aircraft crashing into rapidly rising terrain could not likely be avoided. The bottom line here is that poor weather conditions, and close flight to terrain simply does not mix well.

Accident reference 2 above: The pilot apparently flew the aircraft into terrain, in this case the Potomac River. A radio altimeter might have helped... IF the pilot was required to fly a reasonable minimum altitude of say 500 feet AGL, and IF The pilot was required to set the altimeter to a predetermined minimum setting and complied, and IF and above all else, the altimeter emitted a periodic tone while the aircraft was below the minimum altitude setting instead of extinguishing altogether.

Two of the most important considerations in this accident are; first, the fact that it was a well equipped twin engine helicopter proving that twin engine and equipment does nothing for poor decision making; secondly, the fact that low altitude operations over water are extremely dangerous especially so at night.

Change to 135.168 - Extended over-water operations requirements for helicopters.

With this change, most importantly, if you will cross a body of water you must climb to an altitude which would permit reaching the shoreline in the event of an autorotation regardless of the size, make up, or shape, of the body of water. If you can't climb that high, then you must circumnavigate the body of water. Otherwise, you must have the equipment required in this FAR to fly over the particular body of water.

Change to 135.221 - IFR Alternate airport weather minima.

Here we go losing freedoms again. Like I said earlier when you don't police your actions, someone else is going to do it for you sooner or later. These changes greatly increase IFR minimums with regard to what they were previously for helicopter flight.

Change to 135.271 - Makes all legs a HEMS Flight a part 135 leg.

This is a revision makes all flights involving an HEMS aircraft even those not yet carrying a patient but with any leg of the flight including fueling and return legs, on any flight with the intent to carry a patient, to be defined as a HEMS flight.

This is a very overdue change. This will result in a higher number of accidents to actually be classified as HEMS related, that previously were not classified as an HEMS accidents. I seriously doubt that this regulation in itself will contribute to an actual reduction in the number of accidents though.

Change to 135.293 - Initial and recurrent training requirements.

These changes are specifically relative to training for flat light, white out, and brown out conditions as well as recovery from flight into IIMC (inadvertent IMC).

The changes specified within this part are a step in the right direction, but does not do near enough. Pilots must be qualified and then more than anything, must execute the proper decision when encountering any of these conditions.

The most significant factor conducive to accidents with regard to flat light, white out, and brown out is the fact upon encountering these conditions, the pilots continue to attempt landing instead of aborting the landing using proper techniques.

With regard to encountering IIMC, the most important issue of all is avoidance. Pilots know this, and so do the operators who often push pilots to fly in poor conditions. With regard to HEMS, minimums are simply to low. A low ceiling (less than 1,000 ft AGL) would be alright with unlimited visibility. Low visibility, less than 4-miles, will never be a safe factor regardless of the ceiling. If you combine low visibility, and a low ceiling, you have put together the ingredients for disaster and it will indeed occur in the future as it has many times in the past. All the changes in the FAR's will do absolutely nothing for this.

Compounding the conditions stated above and of equivalent importance is the fact that the FAA constantly holds threats of violations over pilots who may encounter IIMC and execute the proper recovery techniques as opposed to commending them for proper action and perhaps encouraging teaching avoidance. Action such as that would not however give the FAA inspectors the authority ego stoke the so much need. This results in a number of pilots being reluctant to follow proper procedures and declare an emergency as required which ensures that the FAA will indeed be notified that the circumstance occurred. There is also a number of stupid pilots who simply believe that they can successfully descend back into VFR which is pure suicide.

Addition of 135.6xx - This is a whole new section devoted to HEMS operations.

As much as I hate government taking freedom away, this change is way overdue, but still does not go far enough. But hey, that is the FAA, constantly missing the point. But as always, it gives the illusion of the FAA doing something.

135.603 - Here is one where the FAA really missed the boat. A chance to make a difference in pilot qualifications for one of the most challenging, dangerous, and criticized helicopter jobs, and all they do is add an instrument rating requirement and refer back to 135.243 which means that by FAR, a pilot flying a VFR HEMS job (which encompasses the vast majority of HEMS jobs) is only required to have an instrument rating (amounting to 48 hours of simulated experience), and 500 hours total helicopter time. This requirement does give the illusion that the FAA is doing something regardless of how useless it is in reality.

This is a total waste of ink and paper. Mostly due to insurance demands, this was already a requirement. I don't know of a single operator who required less than 2,000 hours total time of which at least 1500 had to be helicopter; and an instrument rating was also already required. If it weren't for insurance, and the loss value to operators, they would certainly require less experience.

An instrument rating with no experience is the same as a 500 hour pilot, he has just enough experience to kill himself and whomever else happens to be onboard the aircraft. The FAA could have really made a difference here by requiring some reasonable instrument experience in any aircraft since flying instruments is flying instruments regardless of aircraft category. This is easy to prove, just take an airplane pilot with instrument experience and put him in a helicopter sim; he won't have a bit of problem.  But on the other hand, take a instrument rated helicopter who has no other real experience and put him in the same sim and he will have all kinds of difficulty.

Had the FAA made a reasonable minimum flight time experience of not less than 3,000 hours total time with at least 2,500 hours helicopter time, and not less than 100 hours of instrument of which at least 50 hours of actual instrument time required, they might have made a difference. Personally, I think there ought to be an age minimum of about 30 also; it has long been proven that the thinking process is different as people age; they become wiser. That is the single most important reason that one must be 35 or older to seek the presidency of the USA.

But as I said before, this does give the illusion that the FAA is doing something which appeases the NTSB, news companies, and the non-flying public!

135.605 - Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System. Well how about this, one that really is of value to HEMS pilots! But do you think three-years to compliance is long enough?  This one is also long over-due! HEMS is the most lucrative of helicopter operations; that is why it has grown so much in the last decade. But the FAA will give operators three years to reasonably equip the helicopters; totally ridiculous.

135.607 - VFR minimum altitudes and visibility requirements. Here we go again, another total miss by the FAA; again they had a chance to make a difference and they completely missed the opportunity! 800 ft AGL and 2-miles visibility is simply not safe enough except to land. If you add the low experience requirements to these poor weather conditions, the stage is set for disaster. This is a perfect of example of the fact that the FAA just does not get it!  Completely surprising since the majority of HEMS accidents occur as a result of pilots who lose control while flying in low ceilings and poor visibility.

The only significant change to this is the fact that the FAA has incorporated minimums for the use NVG's (night vision Imaging system). This is another interesting aspect because the FAA has inspectors managing these programs that have absolutely no practical knowledge of what they are managing. Any FAA inspector who is going to be involved with a company operating these systems should be required to be trained and qualified in them; but not the FAA, they have those who have no experience and don't know, regulating those who have experience and do know. See this example.

Aside from the fact that the FAA permits inspectors who are completely ignorant of these systems to manage them, this is one of the most prevalent examples of how stupid the FAA can be in that battery technology has advanced (lithium batteries), but you can not use them in NVG's simply because the NVG's were approved with alkaline before lithium technology. But that is the FAA!

If the FAA really wanted to make a difference, here was a golden opportunity. 1000 feet AGL day or night, with a minimum of 4-miles visibility non-mountainous, increased to 1,500 feet AGL mountainous with 4-miles visibility, regardless of whether or not NVG's and HTAWS are in use would have made a difference.  Proof again that the FAA is simply trying to save face.

The remainder of the requirements of the new 135.6xx section is relative to IFR, and other recommendations that most operators have already had in effect for the last couple of years. The FAA has just put these changes into law rather than voluntary compliance which was a facade anyway since the FAA would have put anyone not complying through the mill.

Clicking on these photos will enlarge them. I waited until a very dark night with a heavy overcast and no visible stars or moon to take these shots. There were however some lights as can be seen to the left in the photo, and a couple of lights off to the right however not directly visible to the camera lens. The lights to the right showed no significant illumination of this heli-pad without the NVG's, but with the NVG's as can be seen in the photo below, the lights did show significant enhancement. This is a perfect example of how little light it takes to really make a difference with NVG's.

This photo was taken immediately after the one above but through NVG's. This is to demonstrate the difference between what a pilot sees with and without NVG's (night vision goggles). Now bear in mind of course that the pilot does have some aircraft lighting (search lights) to enhance the view without goggles, but it is still very dark; this same enhancement also occurs with goggles which makes then even better. As you an see, using NVG's greatly enhances safety for the pilot, crew, and aircraft in general. It is the difference between night and day.

The important issue here is the fact that those who do not fly into the situations that EMS pilots do on a regular basis, do not place the value on NVG's that really exists.  Another important fact is that NVG technology dates back to the Vietnam war days.  Back then it was primitive by comparison to what we have now. In the early days, if you had significant bright lighting, the NVG's would likely go out. The NVG's we use today are barely affected by such lights. HOWEVER, we are required to adhere to standards developed by the early primitive goggles just like with the alkaline batteries. If an NVG filter gets cracked, yet emits no white light, even though the NVG'S are not affected, we CAN NOT use them. That is the FAA for you, no knowledge and no common sense.

How do I know the FAA inspectors have no knowledge with regard to NVG's?  During a recent inspection by two safety inspectors, I asked them what their experience with NVG's was since they were questioning me about my procedures with them. They both stated that they had NO experience with them. There you go, but FAR's are being written without experience taken from ancient documentation not progressing with the technology, just like with the batteries.          

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Last modified: 12/31/2011